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In the SupreDie Court of the 
State of Utah 
DALE BERKELEY WILSON, 
P-laintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DR. MERRn.L L. OLDROYD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OASE 
NO. 7968 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACI'S 
Respondent's basic objection to appellant's "Statement 
of F~ct'' is not that such statement fails to cite the pages 
of the record claimed to support it, in violation of Utah 
Rules of Civil Prcx:edure 75(p) (2), but that it is confined 
largely to conclusions for the purpose of supporting appel-
lant's theory, disregarding the great weight of the testimony 
refuting it. Where unfavorable evidence is mentioned the 
reference is toned down or glossed over. Far from fairly 
surruharizing the actual testimony, counsel have mentioned 
carefully selected extracts of ·that part of the record which 
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2 
might to some extent have supported their position, had 
the jury believed it. As we understand it, the issue before 
this Court on conflicting evidence· is whether that evi<;lence 
favorable to the plaintiff, which the jury had a right to be-
lieve, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, supports the verdict of the jury. It, therefore, 
is considered necessary to make an additional statement. 
The parties generally will be designated as . they were 
in the lower ·court~ Unless otherwise indicated, references 
indicate the pages of the·· transcript. 
The plaintiff lives at Payson, where he has lived prac-
tically'·an his life (91). He and Geraldine Beck Wilson, 
whom he married in 1939, have two children, Becky Deane 
and Dianne (92). When he and Geraldine were married, 
she was completing her nurse's training in San Francisco. 
The plaintiff for the past six years has been employed in 
the Veterans On-Farm Training program, set up by the 
State Department of Education (92). Prior to that time 
he taught school, and theretofore worked for Houghton Miff-
lin Publishing House in their textbook division ( 93) . 
Plaintiff had known Dr. Merrill Oldroyd about twenty 
years~ He was very friendly with him from the time Dr. 
Oldroyd first came to Payson. That friendship continued 
until the time the ·claimed alienation occurred. Plaintiff 
and the doctor also had business transactions (94). He had 
also been the Wilsons' family doctor for years. He attended 
the birth of one of their children, the plaintiff and his wife 
had gone to him for professional services on numerous oc-
casions. ~~ t09k the tonsils out of plaintiff's children. He 
operated upon ~he plaintiff for thyroid. He performed a 
female operation on the plaintiff's wife in January, 1951 
(95). 
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. ~th plcdntiff and independent witnesses testified to 
the marriage relations of plaintiff and his wife, Geraldi~e 
Beck Wilson. Plaintiff testified that prior to the rna tters 
complained of by plaintiff, he and his wife were very happy. 
They enjoyed each other's companionship. They traveled 
together and they and their families had close and pleasant 
associations in the community. They were very close to-
gether (96). He was always in love with his wife. Gener-
ally every night they would tell each other of their love, 
she being affectionate toward him and he toward her (98). 
Close friends of the Wilsons testified as to their har-
monious relations up to the time the trouble began with 
Dr. Oldroyd, when, not wishing to intrude, they quit seeing 
the Wilsons regularly (8 to 31). This was in the fall of 
1950 when· plaintiff noticed a change in his wife's attitude 
(98-99). 
·Along in August or September, 1950, Geraldine Wil-
son was asked to work at the Payson City Hospital during 
the vacation of one of the nurses., and it wasn't long after 
that when she told the plaintiff she thought she would stay 
on. The question of her staying on was discussed by her 
with plaintiff in November and plaintiff wished her to quit 
but she decided to stay (97). In the latter part of Novem-
ber or the first part of December, plaintiff noted a definite 
change in her in that she was irritable in her home (99). 
She and Dr. Oldroyd told him that it was necessary for 
Geraldine to be operated upon, and the plaintiff thought 
perhaps the irritability of his wife was because of her need 
of an operation (99). In December, the plaintiff went to 
Dr. Oldroyd and told him his wife was a little irritable with 
the children· and him and suggested it was because she was 
run down and asked the doctor to get her to quit working 
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at the hospital (100). Apparently the doctor's response 
was indefinite. 
Mrs. Wilson was operated on the 1st or 2nd of January, 
·1951 (101). . The morning of the operation, the plaintiff 
walked into the room of his wife and the doctor was there 
at the side of her bed. He had lipstick smeared on his face. 
Mrs. Wilson had been given a hypo, and she turned to Dr. 
Oldroyd and said, "0 honey, you like red lips and curley 
hair" (102). 
About the 3rd or 4th of January, 1951, while Geraldine 
was still in the hospital, plaintiff went to Dr Oldroyd's home 
and told him that he was interfering with plaintiff's home 
and that he'd like to have him stop. Dr. Oldroyd denied 
that he had been doing anything as far as Mrs. Wilson was 
concerned, and stated to plaintiff, "You have been the best 
friend that I have ever had." The plaintiff told him that 
he was going to protect his home with everything that he 
could and that he didn't want him interfering (103). In 
December of 1950 or early in January, 1951, defendant 
denied that he was having anything to do with Mrs. Wilson 
and said in words and substance, "Why, Dale, you are ac-
cusing me wrongfully 'here, and my wife will hear of this, 
she is upstairs" (104). 
On or about 9:00 o'clock p.m. the 19th day of January, 
1951, plaintiff went to Dr. Oldroyd's office and pled with 
him to leave his wife alone. Plaintiff then accused Dr. Old-
royd of writing Mrs. Wilson a letter and Dr. Oldroyd de-
nied that he had (106, 107). 
Up to this point, while pla~ntiff had been suspicious 
of Dr. Oldroyd, he had no definite proof to meet the doc-
tor's denials that there was anything between him arid the 
plaintiff's wife (137). While plaintiff testified that it was 
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5 
early in the month of January, 1951, that his wife told him 
that she loved Dr. Oldroyd (192), he didn't know fully what 
was going on until after he got the letter (plaintiff's Ex-
hibits A and B, 194 and 196). ·Up until that time, Dr~ Old-
royd denied that there was anything between plaintiff's wife 
and him, and when plaintiff consulted him about his wife's 
attitude, suggested that the situation should be analyzed to 
figure out where the trouble was ( 46, 47). 
The letter in question was procured by plaintiff from 
the E·ureka post office and was written by Dr. Oldroyd to 
plaintiff's wife and mailed at Eureka (108, 109). The night 
of January 20th, 1951, plaintiff got an appointment with 
Dr. Oldroyd and met him at his office. Mrs. Oldroyd, Dr. 
Oldroyd's wife, was present at the conversation with Dr. 
Oldroyd. Dr .. Oldroyd again denied he had written any 
letter to Geraldine, but when confronted with part of the 
contents of the letter, he finally conceded that he had writ-
ten it (109, 110). 
The letter had the return address on the envelope of 
H. Ockerman, friend of the Wilsons and Dr. ·Oldroyd (110) .. 
Dr. Oldroyd wrote the letter in his own handwriting and 
mailed it to Mrs. Wilson in California (112). The letter, 
over objection, was received into evidence (114, 116), and 
is as follows: 
"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D. 
150 South First West 
Payson, Utah 
1-20-51 
''Geraldine Sweetheart:--
"If ever I need you its tonight. Honey everything 
is so confusing to me I am nearly ·crazy. When I saw 
you last tonight (sic) it was with a broken heart to see 
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you so sad. Honey I just couldn't say good buy (sic) 
I thought I would fall over in the snow before I got 
back into the office. 
"I was so nervous about it all ~ause I t:hot Dale 
might have got hold of that letter. But apparently 
from the way he acted he hadn't seen it. Geraldine My 
Dear right now I am choking back some of those tears 
that were mentioned in that letter. I am a little sorry 
you had to tear it up because there was so much in it 
that might have given you solace. 
"Right now honey at 10/30 p.m. You are Prob-
ably sailing thru the air. I am so concerned about 
you sweetheart. and how I need you right this minute. 
Did you know that Dale ·called me on the telephone and 
told me I had ruined his home, ruined his life, and it 
was all because you are in love with me. 
2. 
"M. L. O~LDROYD, M. D. 
150 South First West 
Payson, Utah 
"Oh! I do need your explanations of these things and 
how am I going to get them. Letters are not always 
expUcit and complete. But I do want you to write and 
explain what happened and why you so suddenly de-
cided to go home. Honey you nearly floored me when 
you called and said you were going and that you 
couldn't talk. 
"I have just come home from Peg's and she tried 
to pacify me as best she could bless her heart. And 
then I called Eddith and she is all upset. Gerry Dear 
you have us all running in circles wondering just what 
has happened. 
''At 6 P. M. and just after you left Dr. Curtis called 
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' 
and a~ked me if I would go over and do an auto~y on 
John Gatley. I told him Yes, thinking it might help 
me and give me a little outlet. But Honey I could 
hardly do it. My Mind was a blank. All I could think 
of was you my Dear. 
f') 
v. 
"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D. 
150 South First West 
Payson, Utah 
"Gerry Dear; please forgive me for any pain or 
embarrassment I have caused you in this whole affair. 
I promise you the pain caused, has hurt me too, and 
the pain to me, and the mental agony we are now going 
thru is only overshadowed by memory of the time we 
have spent together. 
"No Matter what has happened and no matter 
what sadness the future holds, my deep feeling for you 
My Dear will never falter nor waiver. 
"Let Me ask You something else sweetheart and 
please dont misunderstand Honey. Don't take that 
first cigarette. Dont let me lose that battle. I am 
asking that of you my Dear for your own good. and 
well being. I know that you will be tempted. Don't 
suffer the nervousness of quitting for 3 weeks and then 
start I'm afraid you will honey, but if you do 
4. 
"M. L. OLDROYD, M. D. 
150 South First West 
Payson, Utah 
you will hurt Me terribly. Remember Gerry I'm de-
pending on you. I have faith in your word and I am 
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sure that your feeling for me is strong enough that you 
won't deceive me. 
"Deals like this one today nearly kill me and I'm 
sure they do you. But remember that the storm has 
to come before the calm. 
"Write to me often honey. Both Eddith and Peg 
will deliver me the letters and not betray our confi-
dence. Tell me everything you do, and ev,ery place you 
go, and just wish that I could be with you. Tell me 
your father's and Grandmother's reaction to the whole 
thing. Oh I am so interested in you, your well being 
and our ultimate victory over this potential Boomer-
ang. 
"Remember my dear .. all the times I've told you 
"I love you". I still do a thousand fold - believe me -
Write often sweetheart to your humble servant --The 
one who cares. 
"PAYSON CITY HOSPITAL 
Payson, Utah 
"Good Morning Honey: .. You will please pardon me 
for such a wrinkled messed up letter, but just as I fin-
ished it and proof reading it she came down stairs and 
wanted to know who I was writing to and I told her 
you and so help me I thot she was going to take it away 
from me-- We fought and battled all night long. Talked 
diverce proceedings, kids, settlement, etc. You know 
what you have gone thru. Well, I'm going thru it last 
night and again this morning. Its hard to tell you all 
about it in a letter. but honey I'll keep you posted as 
best I ·can. I was going to have sent you a telegram 
at 1 A. M. but at that time the battle was raging. I do 
hope You had a nice pleasant trip, without too much 
depression & tiring. How are your folks? My regards 
to them-----
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"Sweetheart:-- for our protection we had best read 
each others letters and then destroy them. I am so 
lonesome to see you. I was going to the desert this 
morning--but I am too upset. However I may go this 
afternoon. Write Often honey but be sure and not send 
the letters directly to me --- Bye now. I love you" 
(envelope) 
"H. Ockerman 
195 N. 3rd E. 
Payson, Utah 
"Mrs. Geraldine Wilson 
c/o Dr. J. Karl Beck 
5621 Grand Ave 
Riverside, Cal." 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits A and B) 
The reason defendant put the return address on the 
letter was because he wanted the letter, if it were not de-
livered to Mrs. Wilson, to be returned to Mrs. Ockerman 
and not to his wife ( 68) . 
Even after this, plaintiff pled with Dr. Oldroyd to get 
him to leave Mrs. Wilson alone (118). Dale said to him 
the day after receiving the letter, "Doctor, if you will go 
back to your wife, and write my wife to that effect now 
that she is in California, that you have decided that this is 
~ a nnstake, and that you and your wife are going back 
together, I know that she will come back to me, bring the 
kiddies and everything will be fine" (119, 120). Mrs. Wil-
son carne back to Utah about January 26th to 28th, 1951, 
and upon her arrival plaintiff discussed the letter (plain-
tiff's Exhibits A and B) with Mrs. Wilson (121). On Jan-
uary 31st, 1951, Mrs. Wilson met Dr. Oldroyd in his office. 
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This meeting between them was ostensibly for the purpose 
of dis-continuing their relationship (123), but it is obvious 
that it didn't turn out this way. It lasted for about three 
hours (123). When the meeting was over, Dr. Oldroyd had 
lipstick all over his face (123, 124), and had been observed 
by Mrs. Oldroyd with Mrs. Wilson sitting on Dr. Oldroyd's 
lap; they were embracing and kissing each other (556, 557). 
The relationship between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson did 
not stop at the meeting of January 31st, 1951 (125). There 
were meetings in Salt Lake City (50 to 56, 125, 126, 422, 
423, 426); there was a week-end in Las Vegas, Nevada 
(56 to 60, 417, 418, 419') and there was continued corres-
pondence between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (60, 61, 
125). 
The difference from then on was that there was no 
pretense thereafter that a love affair had not been going 
on ,but it was apparent that Dr. Oldroyd had developed a 
. plan whereby he thought he could protect himself from any 
responsibility, and yet continue his relationship with Ger-
aldine Beck Wilson until such time as she ·could get a di-
vorce from Dale. He continued to visit with her, but made 
it a point to have such visits ·while "witnesses" were in the 
general vicinity, even though these "witnesses" were a close 
personal friend, who was a married man, and a single woman 
not his wife who was a friend of the married man (50 to 
59). He made it clear to his own Wife (and the fair infer-
ence is that he held out the same idea to Mrs. Wilson) that 
while he would like to do something financially for the lat-
ter, he could not do so as long as she was Dale's wife (544, 
545). He carried on love correspondence with Mrs. Wil-
son while she was out of the state and correspondence from 
her was generally sent by pre-arrangement in a sealed en-
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velo~ in care of Dr. Oldroyd's personal attorney ~404, 405) 
to be delivered to Dr. Oldroyd, or in care of other friends; 
and the understanding was had between Mrs. Wilson and 
himself that the correspondence would be, and was, de-
stroyed (61-62). Defendant also wanted his correspondence 
destroyed so that Dale wouldn't know he was making love 
to MrS. Wilson ( 526, 527). 
Dr. Oldroyd even rented a post office box in Provo, al-
though his home and office were in Payson (61), presum-
ably so that his correspondence with Mrs. Wilson could be 
carried on with less likelihood of his wife's finding out (61). 
Finally, to complete this design for alienation without re-
sponsibility, he corresponded with Mrs. Wilson prior to her 
action for divorce against the plaintiff (407) (which Mrs. 
Wilson brought after informing Dale that if he didn't sue 
for a diverce, she would), and his attorneys conferred with 
her (436), and prior to the alienation suit, they all conferred 
together (426, 436). 
The defendant states that evidence of the relationship 
of Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson comes entirely from them. 
It is apparent that any information obtained from them was 
obtained only because their relations could not be denied 
in view of the letter which fell into plaintiff's hands, and 
because by investigation by both defendant's wife, as well 
as plaintiff, irrefutable facts were developed which could 
not be avoided. Any information on 'Which plaintiff did 
not have proof was avoided by both Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. 
Wilson, and a reading of their testimony on any point con-
cerning their relations which could not otherwise be estab-
lished by positive testimony will show that it was contra-
dictory, evasive and ambiguous. (See Dr. Oldroyds' testi-
mony 36-74, 511- 527; particularly 511 to 514, 522, 523 to 
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527., and Mrs. Wilson's testimony 359 to 456 and particu-
larly 367, 369, 377, 378, 406, 409, 412, 423, 444, 451, etc). 
It is blandly asserted on page 5 of defendant's brief that 
"there is no evidence in the record or even an intimation 
from the defendant that there was any immoral conduct." 
We do not agree with this statement. We have not pressed, 
and do not now intend to belabor the point, but will let the 
record speak for itself. 
Often there may be inferences probably drawn from 
what witnesses do not say as well as from what they do say. 
For example, on another matter, as pointed out above, Dr. 
Oldroyd had indicated that he couldn't do anything for Mrs. 
Wilson "as long as she was Dale's wife." When Mrs. Wil-
son was asked about the discussion of financial matters be-
tween them, she said: 
Q. "Now, Mrs. Wilson, have you mentioned to 
him (Dr. Oldroyd) about the possibility of him furnish-
ing money to purchase you a house, haven't you?'-
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do you deny that you have? 
A. I said, I don't remember of asking him. 
Q. Would you remember if you had asked him? 
A. I don't know whether I would or not." (370) 
Dr. Oldroyd's deposition was received in evidence over 
his objection. In it, among other things, he stated that the 
first time he told Mrs. Wilson he loved her was on Decem-
ber 7th, 1950 ( 40). .A!bout that time, he took her riding 
out to the Keigley Quarry near the mountains west of Pay-
son and when he brought her back, he kissed her and told 
-her he loved her; he didn't know whether he had kissed 
her the night before when he had taken Mrs. Wilson from 
the hospital to the Ockermans (41); again he testified that 
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the first time he kissed her was in the latter part of No-
vember, 1950 (41). He didn't remember how many occa-
sions he had kissed her ( 42) and he stated evasively that the 
number of times he had told her he loved her ·would be as 
indefinite as the number of times he had kissed her ( 42-43). 
Dr. Oldroyd met Mrs. Wilson in May of 1951 at the 
Ambassador Club or at Mrs. Fields' home. Together were 
one Greer, a married man, a Mrs. Fields (not the wife of 
Mr. Greer), Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (50). Mrs. Wil-
son had written Dr. Oldroyd that she was coming to Utah. 
to file suit for a divorce against Dale, that Dale had agreed 
to file, but hadn't and that she'd ''like to talk this thing 
over" with Dr. Oldroyd, or something to that effect (53). 
Dr. Oldroyd was with Mrs. Wilson four or five hours on 
this occasion (54) . 
Dr. Oldroyd admitted, as plaintiff had testified, that 
plaintiff talked to him about some trouble he was having 
with his wife (72). This, the defendant thought, was in the 
latter part of November, 1950. The defendant said there 
was a gap growing in his own household; this gap had been 
growing· for five or ten years, he said (71-72). That, the 
defendant stated, was the first time he knew about any 
trouble from Dale, but Mrs. Wilson had told him that they 
were having a little difficulty ~before that, at about the time 
she came back from California in 1950. She didn't say in 
words that they were having trouble, but she said that they 
were going to have to move over into the big house, and 
that she had to have an aunt live with her, and then the next 
indication of anything ~between them that wasn't right was 
when Dale talked to him (73). 
On one other occasion in 1950, he told Mrs. Wilson he 
was going down to Zion's Canyon and pick up his daughter 
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and Mrs. Wilson wanted to go with him until she found out 
that his wife was going and then she said, "Count me out." 
(74). 
Q. "Those were the only two incidents then, prior 
to the time that Dale talked to you, that you had any 
idea that there might··.have been· anything wrong be-
tween Geraldine and Dale, if there were? 
A. That's right. 
Q. An~ the time· you talked to Dale may have 
been, as you·testify, after the 6th or 7th of December, 
is that true? . 
A.· I rattier think it was the latter part of No-
vember. 
Q. But you don't remember for sure? 
A. But I don't remember for sure." (75) 
If the defendant, as elose to Mrs. Wilson as he had been, 
did not know of any trouble between her and her husband 
ather than as indicated, it seems fair to infer any real trou-
ble between plaintiff and his wife arose after such interfer-
ence which started in November, 1950, or before. 
Dr. Oldroyd owns 2,700 head of sheep; that are all paid 
for. He testified under oath that they are worth $35 per 
head, but later struck out this figure in his deposition and 
put in $30 (82). At $30 per head they would be worth a 
total of $81,000. He has 50 head of cattle ( 83) . He has 
4,500 acres of grazing land covered by deed. In addition, 
he has a winter grazing permit for 3,000 head of sheep and 
a summer grazing permit for 2.,695 head of sheep. He has 
Government bonds of $8,000 to $10,000. He has 1,000 
shares of stock in the Commercial Bank of Utah, which he 
testified had a par value of $30 per share, which he later 
changed by interlineation in his deposition to $12.50 (84). 
Whether the par was only $12.50 or not, the jury could 
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well have found in accordance with his .original testimony 
that it \Vas worth $30 a share, or a total of $30,000. He 
has 180 acres of pasture land near Payson. He has a home 
in Payson (85). He has secured real property loans owing 
to him of about $30,000 (86). He has a checking account 
of $2,000. He has accounts receivable in his medical pro-
fession of from $30,000 to $35,000. He has two automobiles, 
farm equipment and five or six saddle horses (87, 88). 
It thus appears that by Dr. Oldroyd's own original val-
uations, he has property worth approximately $194,000, 
and in addition the following property upon which 'he did 
not place a value: 50 head of cattle, 4,500 acres of grazing 
land of which he had a deeded title, a winter permit for 
grazing 3,000 head of sheep and a summer permit for 2,69'5 
sheep, 180 acres of pasture land near Payson, two automo-
biles, farm equipment, saddle horses and a home. Consid-
ering the latter property as of minimum value~ it seems 
fair to say that the defendant is worth well over a quarter 
of a million dollars. 
The· testimony of Dr. Oldroyd about purchase of a 
home by Mrs. Wilson is most interesting (590, 591, 592): 
Q. "Has she ever written you and mentioned the 
purchase of a home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And has she ever mentioned the problem of 
payment on it, directly or indirectly? 
MR. WORTHEN: Object to that as indefinite, 
Your Honor, in addition to the other objections, and 
duplications, has she ever mentioned the problem of 
payment, what does he mean? 
THE CO·URT: The objection is overruled. 
A. May I explain? 
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Q. You may answer whether she has or not ever 
mentioned the problem of payment. 
A. You mean of my paying for it? Is that what 
you mean? 
MR. WORTHEN: Now, we object, if he is in-
quiring if anybody else paid, because it is certainly out-
side in this case. 
MR. SHERMAN CHRISTE:NSON: It is cross ex-
amination. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
A. I don't know exactly what you mean. Do 
you mean as to whether I should pay for a payment on 
the home, or whether someone else-----
all? 
Q. Has she written on the subject of payment at 
A. For me to make the payment on her home? 
THE OOURT: Do you understand the question? 
A. No I don't. 
THE OOURT: Think it over. 
A. Well, maybe he can ask it in a question that 
I can understand it. I may be a little thick, but----
MR. WO·RTHEN: Well, don't make any admis-
sions, doctor. 
MR. SHERJMAN CHRISTENSON: Would you 
read him the question. 
Q. Is there anything uncertain about that, doc-
tor, that you don't understand? 
A. I ·can't answer you the question in yes or no. 
There is quite a lot of -----
Q.. If you cantt answer that, doctor, we will pass 
to something else. 
A. OK. Because I don't know what you mean. 
She wrote a letter to me about buying a home, if that 
is-----
Q. Now, doctor, didn't you state to your wife, in 
substance or effect, that you would like to do some-
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thing for Geraldine but you couldn't as long as Geral-
dine was Dale Wilson's wife? 
MR. WORTHEN: May our objection go to this? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
A. I might have done. I don't remember any 
specific occasion. I have said a lot of times I felt sorry 
for Geraldine. 
Q. Now, when was the first time that you said 
you would like t o do something for Geraldine, but you 
couldn't as long as Geraldine was Dale Wilson's wife-
MR. WORTHEN: Just a moment, that presup-
poses something that is not in the record, and a mis-
statement of the witness' testimony, and on the grounds 
otherwise stated we object to it. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
A. I ·couldn't tell you when that time was. I 
haven't the slightest recollection. 
Q. Was that after November, 1950? 
A. That I said I would like to help her? 
Q. Yes, you couldn't as long as she was Dale Wil-
son't wife? 
A. I assume that it was. I don't remember the 
time, though. But I assume it was after November, 
1950. 
Q. Now, you indicated that you told your wife 
that; and was it on more than one occasion that you 
told your wife that? 
A. I just got through testifying that I couldn't 
remember any time -----
,. Q. Was it this year that you toJd her that? This 
year? 
A. I might have done. I don't remember." 
There would seem to be here, despite the evasion, the 
most clear financial inducement held out by defendant for 
the breakup of plaintiff's home. 
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Mrs. Geraldine Beck Wilson was a most willing witness 
for the defendant and when permitted, frequently argued 
for him by volunteer statement. Her thesis was that due 
to the fact that she did not have the conveniences she de-
sired, did not have a nice home and because of various com-
plaints against her husband, she did not love him at the time 
she began her close association with Dr. Oldroyd, but other 
witnesses demonstrated the unfounded basis of her com-
plaints (11, 12, 16, 17, 25, 27, 28), and the pictures of her 
house as received in evidence certainly indicate no cause 
for complaint (Plaintiff's Exhibits C to G, inclusive). She 
admitted that she told no one of any claimed difficulty with 
Dale prior to her close association with Dr. Oldroyd, except 
her father, who was a friend and fellow doctor of defend-
ant ( 437) . Her testimony as to her claims was directly 
contradicted by plaintiff ( 97, 617, 618, 619). 
It is interesting to note that both the defendant and 
Mrs. Wilson testified several times during the trial that the 
defendant urged Mrs. Wilson to stay with her husband, the 
plaintiff; but certainly the actions of the defendant very 
much belied his words, unless he merely wished to have her 
around for him to make love to while she was living under 
the same roof with the plaintiff. 
Any alleged force used by Mr. Wilson, the plaintiff, 
upon his wife, Mrs. Wilson, was after the associations of 
Dr. Oldroyd with Mrs. Wilson were known, and upon a dare 
by Mrs. Wilson (342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 441). 
Defendant at the trial and in his brief makes great 
point of the claim (397) that after January 1st, 1951, he 
was not alone with Mrs. Wilson, except for one occasion. 
The evidence shows that after that time he had written en-
dearing letters to Mrs. Wilson in which he had asked her to 
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destroy certain letters (60, 61, 62, 541, 558, 559) ; had me~ 
her in Las Vegas in company with another married roan 
and a \voman not such married man's wife, and stayed a 
weekend at the same hotel Mrs. Wilson stayed at without 
the knowledge of defendant's wife (56, 57, 58, 59, 661, 662, 
664, 665, 666) ; had called her on the telephone on different 
occasions and expressed his affection for her (61); and yet 
the defendant and defendant's counsel seem to feel that ev-
erything was entirely all right if the defendant did not see 
Mrs. Wilson "alone." 
For the facts concerning the Las Vegas weekend, we 
are not compelled to rely entirely on the testimony of the 
defendant and Mrs. Wilson, whi·ch, itself, made such trip 
unexplainable on any proper basis, but we may also have 
recourse to certain reasonable inferences flowing, among 
other things, from the fact that Greer and Betty Fields, 
close friends of the defendant, were on the same trip, were 
available to the defendant at the trial, and were not called 
by the defendant -concerning this trip, Betty Fields not be-
ing called at all, although she was in Provo at the time of 
the trial and Greer being called by the defendant for a few 
questions on an entirely different matter (564-567). More-
over, the defendant concealed the trip from his own wife, 
driving clear up to Sun Valley, Idaho, from Las Vegas, Ne-
vada, presumably right through Payson, where his wife 
was, and calling his wife only from Sun Valley, apparently 
to lead her to think he had been there and not at Las Vegas 
(661, 662). 
When Dale in a telephone conversation with Geraldine's 
father indicated he was at fault (355), the facts justify not 
the inference defendant seeks to draw, for it was clear that 
the trouble was not Dale's fault, but only that even as late 
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as March 17th, 1951, Dale still had great affection for his 
wife, taking blame for the situation that had arisen from 
the defendant's interference, and was still trying desperately 
to save his marriage. 
All through the testimony of Mrs. Wilson, there may 
be noted a compelling desire to say anything which might 
be favorable to the defendant, even when objections were 
being made. It was obvious that the alienation of her af-
fections from her former husband had been accomplished 
thoroughly and completely. 
On cross examination, Mrs. Wilson was forced to ad-
mit that she had affection for Dr. Oldroyd in January of 
1951 (359), in December of 1950 (359) and that she had 
admiration for him in November of 1950 (359); that she 
liked him in November and December of 1950 (360) and 
that her affection grew from November, 1950 to December, 
1950; that she liked him more in November, 1950, than in 
1941 (361); that she didn't know whether she liked him 
better in November than he liked him in the preceding year, 
in 1949 (362). She also admitted on cross examination that 
she had kissed Dr. Oldroyd on different occasions and that 
Dr. Oldroyd had kissed her. She didn't know how many 
times ( 363). She testified on cross examination that she 
first kissed Dr. Oldroyd in December of 1950, and that Dr. 
Old~oyd kissed her in December of 1950 (363, 364); that 
on one occasion when Dr. Oldroyd kissed her they were 
parked out at Keigley Quarry near the west mountains west 
of Payson (364). All of this occurred when the doctor 
knew she was married to the plaintiff (365). She admitted 
on cross examination that Dr. Oldroyd had kissed her on 
another occasion when he had driven her to a club meeting 
within a night or two of the Keigley Quarry episode (365). 
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Mrs. Wilson further admitted on cross examination 
that she loved Dr. Ol~royd in December, 1950 (367). She 
admitted that Dr. Oldroyd was nice to her (367); she testi-
fied that she didn't remember when the defendant first 
wrote and told her that he loved her (368), but admitted 
that when the doctor had written to her he told her to de-
troy his letters to her (369) and that the defendant may 
have said that he would destroy her letters to him (369); 
and that she did destroy all of Dr. Oldroyd's letters to her 
(405-406). 
lVfrs. Wilson on cross examination testified that iDr. 
Oldroyd met her in Salt Lake City in June, 1951, when she 
flew to Salt Lake City; that this occasion was before the 
Las Vegas trip, and that she kissed Dr. ,Oldroyd good-bye 
on that occasion ( 423) . Mrs. Wilson admitted that it may 
have been in May of 1951 when she stayed the first time 
overnight with Betty Fields (who came with Dr. Oldroyd 
and Mr. Greer when they met Mr. Wilson in Las Vegas) 
(424). 
~Irs. Wilson admitted on cross examination that when 
plaintiff had an operation in 1949, she sobbed and cried, but 
stated it was because she was worn out ( 433, 434). 
She admitted on cross examination that he couldn't 
remember whether she had mentioned to anyone other than 
her father and Dale that she was unhappy prior to Novem-
ber, 1950, but then admitted she testified upon a deposition 
that she said nothing to anyone else before that time (427). 
She testified that she didn't know how long she had 
been in love with Dr. Oldroyd at the time Mr. Wilson, plain-
tiff, spanked her ( 441). She told plaintiff to go ahead and 
spank her ( 44~). Mrs. Wilson testified on cross examina-
tion that it was during the time Dr. Oldroyd was telling her 
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encouraged her to stay with Dale ( 444). 
Mrs. Wilson testified that she told Dale after she had 
fallen in love with Dr. Oldroyd that if he didn't get a di-
vorce, she would (445). She testified on cross examination 
as follows ( 449) : 
Q. "But you continued to live with him as a wife 
until you fell in love with Dr. Oldroyd, didn't you? 
MR. WORTHEN: I object to that, Your Honor, 
as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not proper 
cross examination. Duplicitous. 
THE ·COURT: Were you finished? 
MR. WORTHEN: Presuming, assuming some-
thing not in the record. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. That is a fact, isn't it Mrs. Wilson? 
A. That I continued to live with him as his wife? 
Q. Yes, until you fell in love with Dr. Oldroyd? 
A. I lived with him as his housekeeper. 
Q. You say you didn't live with him as a wife? 
A. I didn't -----
Q. Did you sleep with him after that? 
A. In August. 
Q. Yes. 
A. For a few weeks, yes. 
Q. And in a few weeks you had fallen in love with 
Dr. Oldroyd, hadn't you? 
MR. W,O,RTHEN: Object to that as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor, not proper re-
cross and repetition. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. That is right, isn't it? 
A. I said I didn't know when I fell in love with 
Dr. Oldroyd.'' 
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Plaintiff testified that he and his wife ceased sleeping 
together in March, 1951· (187). 
Mrs. Wilson testified that she hadn't seen Dr. Oldroyd 
alone since January 31st, 1951, but that she had seen him 
in company with Mrs. Fields, Mr. Greer and Mrs. Fields' 
daughter (451). She was asked the following question and 
gave the following answer (451): 
Q. "Have you made it a point to have those peo-
ple with you when you have associated with Dr. Old-
royd, or has it just happened? 
A. I don't know as it is a point or not. I don't 
remember of ever making it a point when I have seen 
him in company with anyone else. I have had no rea-
son to see him with anyone else." 
She admitted that she was alone with Dr. ~Oldroyd in 
February, 1951, but stated that she had forgotten (453). 
Mrs. Wilson admitted that in February of 1951, Mr. 
Wilson was trying to get Dr. Oldroyd to leave her alone 
(455); she didn't know whether she and plaintiff had been 
quarreling about her love for the defendant (455, 456). 
Helen McNabb was called as a witness for the defend-
ant and testified that she knew Mrs. Wilson since 1940. In 
an effort to show that Mr. Wilson's conduct toward Mrs. 
Wilson was cold, she testified that in 1940 there were sev-
eral couples that went to Payson Canyon on a party and 
members of the group were necking and acting silly and 
that plaintiff didn't neck in public with his wife ( 462). She 
thought it was unusual that Dale Wilson wasn't loving up 
his wife while other couples were around ( 479). Mrs. Mc-
Nabb was married when she was fifteen (479). Mrs. Mc-
Nabb, on cross examination, admitted that on many occa-
sions she saw Mrs. Wilson show affection for plaintiff (483). 
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She testified that about ten years ago when her husband 
and Dale went pheasant hunting, Mrs. Wilson had to get 
up and make the fire but she didn't remember whether her 
husband and Dale got up early, built a fire and cooked their 
breakfast and left Mrs. Wilson in bed. She didn't know 
when the pheasant hunt started then-whether morning or 
noon (485). Mr. Wilson testified that he and Mr. McNabb 
went hunting early in the morning, made the fire, cooked 
breakfast and left early, about 6 :30 in the morning. The 
season opened early in the morning that year (621). 
Mrs. McNabb came all the way from Portland by ar-
rangement with the defendant to give her testimony, and 
the few trivial troubles that she had ever observed bespoke 
well for the married happiness of the plaintiff and his wife 
over the years. 
Mrs. Lola Oldroyd, wife of the defendant, was called 
by the defendant and an unsuccessful effort was made by 
him to limit her testimony to defendant's counterclaim; a 
fine woman, apparently tom between an effort to try to 
please the defendant in an effort to salvage her own mar-
riage and her duty to testify as a witness, she reluctantly 
testified on ·cross examination that on or about February 
7th, 1952, after this case had been filed, as far as she knew 
her husband, the defendant, and Mrs. Wilson were corres-
ponding at that time and that she knew they were talking 
on the telephone (530, 531); that she had given a great deal 
of thought to efforts to break up the romance between Dr. 
Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson (533). She further stated on cross 
examination that on February 7th, 1952, the romance be-
tween Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson was going on and had 
been up to the time of the trial herein (534, 535). There 
was nothing to indicate that the relations between Mrs. Wil-
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son and Dr. Oldroyd were any different in February, 1952, 
than they had been in August, 1951. Her ideas about the 
relations between ~Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson were the 
same in August, 1951 as they were in February of 1952 
(536). 
Mrs. Oldroyd in answer to questions on cross examina-
tion as to whether she ·had told Mr. Wilson, plaintiff's father, 
that Dr. Oldroyd had given her some instructions with re-
spect to some proceeds of an insurance poHcy for Mrs. Wil-
son, she testified as follows ( 543, 544, 545) : 
A. "I may state here, that in regards to this ques-
tion, the doctor has told me, not only once, but many 
times, that he felt sorry for Mrs. Wilson because she 
was so unhappy, and he said, 'I would like to help her 
but I can't help her, I ·can't help her as long as she is 
a married woman.' 
Q. I see. And did he tell you in that connection 
that he would wait until she was a single woman to help 
her? 
A. He didn't tell me anything definite. He said, 
'I would like to help her but I can't'. 
Q. As long as she is a married woman, is that 
right? 
A. In fact, the exact words -----
Q. Now, just answer. 
A. -----was, 'As long as she is married to Dale I 
·can't help her.' 
· Q. . I think you mentioned so that it shows in the 
record that you made no statement concerning what 
Dr. Oldroyd told you about $50,000, to Mr. Wilson, there 
was no mention of that, is that right? 
A. I don't remember of mentioning any amount 
of money to Mr. Wilson or Dr. Oldroyd had never men-
tioned $50,000 to me. 
Q. Has he mentioned any other particular sum? 
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A. The only thing he has ever said -----
Q. Pardon me, you said the only thing that he 
said-----
A. He has said, 'I would like to help her because 
she is so unhappy; but under the ·circumstances I can't.' 
Q. As long as she is Dale's wife, is that correct? 
A. We discussed it several tlmes; I was vecy sus-
picious and I asked him. And that was his answer ev-
ery time, 'I ·can't help her. I would like to but I con't.' " 
Mrs. Oldroyd further testified on cross examination 
as follow.s (553, 554): 
Q. "Now, let me ask you this, Mrs. Oldroyd, did you 
also tell Mr. Wilson, Dale's father, on that occasion 
that when Geraldine came back from Los Angeles, Dr. 
Oldroyd told you that he did not want to be disturbed 
while she was there and asked you to care for Mark, 
and see that he did not ·come downstairs? (Mark is 
the young son of Dr. and Mrs. Oldroyd) * 
A. Yes.. 
Q. You told him that? 
A. Yes. I asked him-----
Q. iDid you also tell that you got suspicious and 
took Mark up to Santaquin and left him with a friend 
of yours? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you also tell Mr. O~droyd (sic) on that 
~asi<>n-----
MR. WORTHEN: Who? 
Q. Or Mr. Wilson, Dale's father, that you went 
up, you selected a dark place in the hall where you 
c<>uld both hear and see, when you g<>t back after tak-
ing your son up to Santaquin? 
A. I told him that I made it a point to be in the 
house where I could see and hear." 
(*Parentheses ours) 
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Mrs. Oldroyd testified further on cross examination 
that she saw Mrs. Wilson sit on Dr. Oldroyd's lap (556) and 
saw Mrs. Wilson kiss Dr. Oldroyd while sitting on his lap 
(557). 
She further testified on cross examination as follows 
(562, 563): 
Q. "Did you not also tell Mr. Dale Wilson, either 
in May or June, 1951, that Dr. Oldroyd had asked for 
a divorce, hut that he had ruined your life and that 
you didn't propose to give him a divorce? 
A. Dr. Oldroyd has never asked me for a divorce. 
Q. . I am asking you, Mrs. Oldroyd -----
A. I didn't tell Dale he had asked me for a di-
vorce. Mr. Wilson asked me if he was getting a di ... 
vorce and I said, 'Not that I know of', in his ·conversa-
tion in May. 
Q. Did you also add that he had ruined your life, 
and that you didn't propose to give him a divorce until 
your son, your youngest son, had reached his majority? 
A. Something to that effect, I wouldn't say they 
were the same words.'' 
Her words, according to the testimony of plaintiff, 
were, "Frankly, he has ruined my life and I am not going 
to give him a divorce and let him ruin anyone else's, and 
until our boy, Mark, who is five years old, becomes of age, 
he will have a hard time getting a divorce" (623). 
Mrs. Oldroyd, on cross examination, testified that at 
the time of the doctor's trip to Las Vegas, when he met Mrs. 
Wilson, he called Mrs. Oldroyd from Sun Vlalley on Mon-
day evening about 7 o'clock (661, 662). It was the day 
following the time she had a telephone conversation with 
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her sister in Las Vegas. She had told Mrs. Oldroyd that 
Dr. Oldroyd had just left Las Vegas (662), and she further 
testified that he didn't call her home on his way from Las 
Vegas to Sun Valley (662). As far as Dr. Oldroyd's con-
versation from Sun Valley, that was where his trip had 
been. He didn't mention a word that he had been to Las 
Vegas (665). The first time that Mrs. Oldroyd knew that 
Geraldine Wilson was in Las Vegas with Dr. Oldroyd was 
when Dale told Mrs. Oldroyd (667). 
The defendant had called his wife, Mrs. Oldroyd, in an 
attempt to establish on his counterclaim for slander that 
her suspicions had been aroused by plaintiff's statements 
to her, but her cross examination established that her sus-
picions of her husband were really more than suspicion, as 
the result of first-hand knowledge from her own investi-
gation. 
She denied on cross examination that she had made 
some statements attributed to her, but on impeachment, 
.Melvin Wilson testified that he talked to Mrs. Oldroyd on 
or about August 5th, 1951, in front of his home at the re-
quest of Mrs. Oldroyd (595, 596), when Geraldine had come 
from Los Angeles; that Mrs. Oldroyd told him that she saw 
Dr. Oldroyd and Geraldine hugging and kissing (600, 601); 
that she heard them planning their future (601). That she 
stood in the hall for about an hour and a half and then 
grew disgusted (602). That she would accuse him of writ-
ing to Geraldine and then hear him lie out of it ( 602) ; that 
Geraldine had asked him for money to ·buy a house, when 
she could not find one, but he told her it was too risky for 
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both of them until she got a divorce (602, 603). That when 
Dr. Oldroyd was sick, he wanted Mrs. Oldroyd to promise 
that she would give the one insurance policy to Geraldine 
if anything happened to him (603, 604, 605). That Dr. Old-
royd had told Mrs. Oldroyd that Mrs. Wilson would make 
a queen in his (Oldroyd's) home (605); that Dr. ~Oldroyd 
had asked Mrs. Oldroyd what she would take to release 
him and that she had told him it would take every dollar 
he O\vned and Dr. Oldroyd had said, "Well, it might be 
worth it" ( 605) . 
Various statements relied upon and emphasized in de-
fendant's brief and claimed to have been made by plaintiff 
concerning his attitude toward his. wife, or to the effect that 
the trouble was his fault or concerning his financial interest 
in the case, or his attorneys' fees, or about his objections 
to Mrs. Wilson's association with another doctor, or the 
value he placed on his wife, or his motives in bringing this 
suit and other similar matters, and various claims with re-
spect to the conditions under which the Wilsons lived and 
concerning other women, by which defendant attempts to 
create prejudice against the plaintiff, were specifically de-
nied by plaintiff or fully explained to the extent that they 
were not obviously groundless (192, 202, 203, 210, 211, 213, 
214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 
617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 634). The jury had the right to 
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and resolve con-
flicts in their testimony, and it would be unduly extending 
this Statement of Facts to quote in full the evidence dis-
regarded by defendant. 
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Point I. The court did not err in denying defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and defendant's mo-
tion for a more definite statement or in admitting testi-
mony over defendant's objection that the complaint failed 
to state a cause of action. 
The complaint reads: 
(Title of court and cause) 
"Plaintiff complains of the defendant and for cause of 
action alleges: 
"1. That plaintiff and Geraldine Beck Wilson were 
lawfully married in Reno, Nevada, on or about June 
4th, 1H39. 
"2. That plaintiff and said Geraldine Beck Wilson 
lived together happily as husband and wife with two 
children born to them until the affections of said Ger-
aldine Beck Wilson, plaintiff's wife, were alienated by 
the defendant as hereinafter set forth. 
"3. That during the period October 15th, 1950 to Oc-
tober 24th, 1951, the said defendant, well ·knowing 
that the said Geraldine Beck Wilson :was the wife of 
plaintiff, wrongfully, wilfully and maUciously alienated 
the affections of said Geraldine Beck Wilson from the 
plaintiff. 
"4. As a direct result of defendant's actions in alien-
ating the affections of said Geraldine Beck Wilson from 
plaintiff, said plaintiff has been and is wrongfully de-
prived by defendant of the comfort, society and aid of 
the said Geraldine Beck Wilson, and of the children 
of said Geraldine Beck Wilson and plaintiff, all to plain-
tiff's damage in the sum of $75,000.00. 
"5. That the acts of the defendant in alienating the 
affections of plaintiff's wife were malicious, and were 
done in wanton disregard of the rights, feelings and 
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reputation of the plaintiff, and the reputation -of his 
family and by reason thereof, plaintiff demands exemp-
lary and punitive damages against the defendant in the 
sum of $25,000.00. 
"\VHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment from the 
defendant as follows: 
"1. For the sum of $75,000.00 compensatory damages. 
"2. For the sum of $25,000.00 punitive damages. 
"3. For costs of court. 
H4. For such other and further relief as to the court 
may seem proper.'' 
The action was filed after the effective date of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to-wit: on November 9th, 1951. 
Defendant's argument under this point is confined large-
ly to fragmentary references to old cases. 
In no case cited by defendant is the complaint held not 
to state a cause of action. In all but the last case cited by 
him, the demurrers were held properly overruled and in the 
last case the demurrer was held to be eroneously sustained 
and the trial court was reversed on that ground. All of the 
cases cited were under the old practice. 
On the other hand, our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
simply provide that a pleading which sets forth a claim 
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the re-
lief to which he deems himself entitled. (Rule 8(a)) 
The examples given in the rules (appendix) are con-
sistent with the pleading in this case. The marriage, the 
existence of a happy relation, the wrongful alienation of 
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the affections of plaintiff's wife, and the resulting depriva-
tion by defendant of her comfort, society and aid, with re-
sulting damage to plaintiff, all appear. That the defend-
ant aliena ted the affections of the wife is an ultimate fact, 
the means claimed being details which the plaintiff could 
and did obtain by the discovery processes provided by the 
rules and other available means. 
We refer to some of the cases cited by defendant on 
the question of pleading to show their inapplicability on this 
point, and because of the background they may furnish as 
to other points. 
Buckley v. Francis~ 78 Utah 606, 6 P.2d 188, is cited on 
page 14 of appellant's brief in support of the argument that 
the allegations of the complain11 were insufficient. This 
case does not turn on any question of pleading. The opin-
ion recited that, "This action is founded upon a complaint 
wherein plaintiff alleged that his wife's affections for him 
were wrongfully and unlawfully alienated by defendant to 
plaintiff's damage in the sum of $10,000.00 for which amount 
plaintiff prayed judgment against the defendant." A ref-
erence to the complaint as shown in the abstract of the 
record in that case will indicate that the Supreme Court's 
language is a fair summary of the ultimate facts alleged, 
omitting only matters of inducement, emphasis and detail. 
Monson v. Solace (Mont) 212 Pac. 1103, cited on page 
14 of appellant's brief alleged the means by which the alien-
ation was accomplished, but the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana in upholding the sufficiency of the complaint had this 
to say: 
". . . . In such an action the complaint should 
set forth the marriage relation and the loss by the 
plaintiff of the person, affection, society and aid of his 
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or her wife or husband, and that the same was accom .. 
plished by the intentional, wrongful or malicious con-
duct of the defendant. We are of the opinion that 
reansonably construed the First Cause of Action states 
all of these ultimate facts." 
Certainly such ultimate facts are also stated in plain-
tiff's complaint here, to an extent probably sufficient un-
der the old rules, and fully in keeping with the spirit, letter 
and example of the new rules. As indicated, the defendant 
had full opportunity for information as to details of evi-
dence through transcripts of the divorce proceedings, and 
through depositions prior to the trial, and he can make no 
claim that he was misled or prejudiced through ignorance 
of the detailed basis of the plaintiff's cause of action. 
Williams v. Williams (Colo) 37 Pac. 614, was decided 
in 1894 and manifestly before Colorado adopted its Rules 
of Civil Procedure patterned after the Federal rules. This 
case, contrary to the inference contained in appellant's 
brief, holds expressly that in an action for enticing away 
a wife, it is sufficient to allege in the cmplaint the ultimate 
facts without a statement of the arts made use of to ac-
complish the alleged purpose (p. 616) . It is true that some-
what more detail of the a~ resorted to is alleged than ap-
pears in the complaint in the instant ·case, but even under 
the old practice it is inferred that these additional details 
are unnecessary, and the earlier case of French v. ·'Deane, 
36 Pac. 609, is quoted with approval on this point. 
The same conclusion is reached in White v. White (Kan) 
90 Pac. 1087. Syllabus 2 of that case summarizes the rule 
as follows: 
"In an action by a wife for the alienation of the affec-
tions. of her husband, a statement in the petition of the 
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ultimate facts of the alienation and separation is enough 
without pleading the acts done and artifices used to ac .. 
complish the result." 
Gvirtz v. Leiser, et ux (Colo) 58 P.2d 481, cited pp. 14-
15 in appellant' :brief on the same point, was likewise decided 
long prior to the adoption by Colorado of its new Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and yet the complaint involved under the 
old practice there was sustained. 
The quotation appearing in appellant's brief from Nich· 
ols v. 'Nichols (Mo.) 35 SW 577, indicates that even under 
the old practice allegations such as are contained in the 
complaint in the case at bar should be sufficient. The rule 
announced there is to the effect that a petition alleging that 
defendant wrongfully enticed, influenced and induced plain-
tiff's husband to abandon her and to live separate and apart 
from her thereby depriving, and intending to deprive, her 
of his affection, comfort, society and support, states a cause 
of action. In that case the sustaining of a demurrer by the 
trial court was held error. 
The complaint stated a claim for alienation of affec-
tion; defendant had available to him all of the effective in-
struments of discovery under the new rules (Rules 26 to 37) 
as well as details from the divorce action. His motion to 
dismiss, and motion for a more definite statement were 
properly overruled, his objection to the introduction of evi-
dence was properly denied, and no possible error or preju-
dice in such rulings is indica ted. 
Point D. The verdict was not excessive· and was not giv~n 
under the influence of passion or pr~judice. 
Granted that the amount of the judgment is substan-
tial and finds few precedents in this state, yet the combin-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
ation. of facts as shown by the record indicating the right 
to damages, both compensatory and punitive, and the per-
sistency, adroitness and aggravated nature of defendant's 
design in view of the relations of the parties, have few, if 
any, precedents, either. 
The amount of damages awarded is a matter peculiarly 
within the province of the jury. Mere amount of a verdict, 
however great, does not of itself indicate passion or preju-
dice. There is nothing in the record to show anything but 
considered, patient, justifiable action on the part of both 
the trial judge and the jury, despite the attacks and innu-
endos of the defendant. Really, what the defendant is com-
plaining of is that both the judge and jury did not adopt his 
theory and put their stamp of approval on defendant's ·con-
duct, which would have been a violation of their oaths. 
As to the amount of punitive damages, there can hardly 
be an argument. In view of the defendant's wealth, his ar-
rogant attitude even toward his own wife when he told her 
he wasn't ashamed of anything he had done (564), as well 
as to-vvard the plaintiff; the fact that despite the efforts of 
the plaintiff to get him to desist, he continued right up to 
the time of the divorce to associate with plaintiff's wife, and 
to ·collaborate with her in connection with the divorce, and 
in view of the interest of his own family, plaintiff, and the 
public as a whole, in having such conduct not lightly 
shrugged off, the verdict should stand. Anything less than 
the amount awarded for punitive damages would have been 
a mere slap on the wrist. 
As to the compensatory damages ·alone; they are not 
by any means unprecedented in tort actions in the state 
and as compared with verdicts and settlements in other 
states, they may be regarded as hardly more than moderate. 
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The value of the dollar has decreased considerably since 
most of the verdicts cited by defendant were rendered. 
But we do not intend to minimize the verdict. It was, 
indeed, a substantial verdict for substantial injury. There 
was the companionship, society, aid and conjugal affection 
of one who was, before the alienation, a beautiful, talented, 
accomplished, industrious and loving wife and mother. The 
jury did not have to rely upon the testimony of plaintiff 
only, although they had a right to do so; they had ·their 
own observation, inferences to be drawn from Geraldine 
Beck Wilson's testimony itself and the testimony of the 
Harmers, disinterested witnesses who for seven or eight 
years before the alienation had known the Wilsons inti-
mately and had been with them and their ·children up to 
four or five times a week (8-30). Can the defendant say 
that the jury put too great a value on this ·conjugal rela-
tionship? We are taught that the things of the spirit are 
sometimes of greater real worth than physical things and 
we have examples both in life and literature which lead 
some to believe that loved ones are more precious than life 
itself. Be that as it may, certainly the value placed upon 
the conjugal rights of the plaintiff bear true relationship 
to their value as the evidence tended to show and the de-
fendant, himself, by his conduct confinned such valuation 
as being moderate indeed. Is it not true that for his asso-
ciation with, and affection for, plaintiff's wife he was wil-
ling to risk everything he had--including his own family, 
his entire fortune and not just a relatively small portion 
thereof? Even after both his own wife and the plaintiff 
had discovered his purpose and had protested against its 
continuation, he still valued his association with the plain-
tiff's wife so highly that he persistently continued his re-
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lationship with her right up to the time of the divorce and 
' 
afterwards. 
Defendant may depreciate the value of Geraldine Beck 
Wilson's affection now, but we think what John P. Curran, 
Irish Advocate, in the case of Rev. Charles Massy against 
the Marquis of Headford, said many years ago in a similar 
case is pertinent: 
J'The learned counsel has told you that this unfortunate 
woman is not to be estimated at forty thousand pounds 
(the ad damnum). Fatal and unquestionable is the 
truth of that assertion . . . . But it is the honor, 
the hope, the expectation, the tenderness and the com-
forts that have been blasted by the defendant and have 
fJed forever that you are to remunerate the plaintiff." 
Tne plaintiff was entitled not only to damages for the 
temporary loss up to the time of the divorce, but his per-
manent or prospective loss of conjugal rights as the jury 
may have determined that loss to be. Restatement of Law 
of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 910, p. 559; Riggs v. Smith (Idaho), 
11 P.2d 358. 
The plaintiff was entitled to reasonable compensation 
for humiliation and mental pain and suffering, upon which 
it would be difficult to place an adequate price under the 
circmnstances. Lambert v. Sine, Utah , 256 
P.2d 241. 
The cases cited by appellant do not indicate that the 
judgment in this case is excessive or should be reduced or 
set aside. 
Oskamp v. Oskamp, (Ohio), 152 NE 208 (1926) is cited 
by appellant on pages 17-18 of his brief in an effort to show 
that the verdict in the case at bar was excessive and that 
the final award of "$75,000" by the ~Ohio Appellate Court 
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involved circumstances of an aggravated character as com-
pared to the Oldr~yd case. As we shall later point out in 
detail, the final award was $100,000, rather than $75,000 ex-
cept as to one defendant. The Appellate Court held that 
the evidence of conspiracy to alienate the husband's affec-
tions from the ·wife sustained the verdi·ct. It said: 
"Some evidence was admitted that might have been ex-
cluded and some rejected that it would not have 
been error to have admitted but when these instances 
are considered with all the evidence on the issue pre-
sented in this case, no prejudicial error has intervened. 
A review of the evidence offered by the defendants be-
low left the impression that an effort was being made 
to establish that W. Herbert Oskamp, by his voluntary 
act, ended his marital relations with his wife and that 
he had just cause for so doing, or that the defendants, 
while denying the conspiracy, sought to justify these 
acts. The jury did not believe either of these theories." 
On the question of the $100,000 awarded by the jury, 
the Ohio court had this to say: 
"It is argued that the verdict is excessive. We know of 
. no rule by which this court could fix a sum different 
than that found by the jury. We might suggest an 
amount that in our opinion the jury should have found. 
But there is no authority of law for us to substitute our 
judgment for the verdict. Perhaps there is one ele-
ment that might be considered and that is on the ques-
'Pon of punitive damages against Mrs. Ryan. The rec-
ord of the part that she took in furtherance of the con-
spiracy is very limited. There was, however, sufficient 
evidence to take the case to the jury and they found 
that she with the others was guilty of actual malice. 
In that view of the case, this court has discussed the 
question of a remittitur. 
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Our conclusion is that, while the jury found that Mrs. 
Ryan was guilty of conspiracy, including actual malice, 
toward the plaintiff, the evidence as to her is slight. 
\Ve think she should be relieved of part of this verdict, 
and for that reason we will require plaintiff below to 
submit to a remittitur of $25,000, or a new trial will 
be granted. Judgment accordingly." . 
It thus appears that only as to one of the defendants, 
Mrs. Ryan, was the $100,000 verdict considered out of line 
and that an award of $75,000 against her was ordered, not-
withstanding that "the record of the part she took in the 
conspiracy was slight.'' There are no facts indicated in the 
opinion as to any defendant of a character as aggravated 
as is shown in the case at bar. Yet, even as to Mrs. Ryan, 
concerning which the evidence was not regarded as strong, 
an award of $75,000 was sustained. 
Overton v. Overton, (Okla) 246 Pac. 1095, is referred 
to on page 19 of appellant's brief, involved an award by 
the jury of $150,000 reduced by the Oklahoma Appell~te 
Court to $40,000. The comment is made by appellant that 
plaintiff's husband and the defendant in that case were mar-
ried after plaintiff's divorce. This does not appear to be any 
more aggravated a case than where the defendant himself 
was married to another woman and was a trusted friend 
and physician of plaintiff and his family and he neverthe-
less persisted in breaking up the home of the plaintiff. In 
the Overton case, the award of $30,000 punitive damages 
was upheld in full and the compensatory damages reduced 
by reason, at least in part, of the fact that from the divorce 
of the parties, plaintiff already had received a division of 
community property from her husband (p. 1098). 
The California case of Mohn v. Tingley, 217 Pac. 733, 
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(decided in 1923) , cited by appellant in page 18 of his brief, 
is sought to be distinguished from the instant case by the 
statement that the court there found a malicious and per-
sistent course of conduct to engender ill will between hus-
band, wife and child and that the defendant had induced 
plaintiff to contribute about $300,000 to a society of which 
defendant was the head. A verdict of $75,000 compensa-
tory and $25,000 punitive damages was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of California. The evidence showed in that 
case an improper and unjustifiable interfe~rence with the 
marriage of the plaintiff by the defendant made possible 
by undue influence of the defendant. But hardly less can 
be ~said of the situation in the case at bar, such influence be-
ing gained by the relationship of family friend and physi-
cian; and while the means utilized by appellant in the case 
at bar were more adroit and ·concealed, they were equally 
wilful, intentional and improper. 
The case of Scharwath v. Brooks, 145 Atl. 727 and 150 
Atl. 211 (decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
1929) is cited in appellant's brief by reason of verdicts of 
$90,000 and $70,000 having been successively set aside and 
a reduction to $20,000 ordered on the second appeal as an 
alternative to a new trial. In this ·case, however, as a re-
sult of the alienation and subsequent divorce, plaintiff had 
received a $35,000 house, $20,000 in cash and $4,000 per 
year, which the New Jersey_ court felt should have been 
taken into consideration by the jury in fixing the award. 
Wilson gained nothing by the alienation, the result being 
not only the loss of the aid, companionship, comfort and 
society of his wife, his mental distress and humiliation and 
the other elements of damage, but the monetary obligations 
assessed against him in the divorce action. There is noth-
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ing in the opinions to indicate that the facts are analogous 
to those of the instant case either in respect to the loss suf .. 
fered by plaintiff, the acts of the defendant or defendant's 
ability to respond to punitive damages. 
Slaughter v. Van Winkle, 2 P.2d 789, cited on page 19 
of appellants brief, was decided in 1931 and involved an 
aunt with ·whom th parties lived. The facts do not appear 
comparable. 
In Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 Atl. 692 (1930), ·cited on 
pp. 19·20 of appellant's brief, the jury awarded $20,000 and 
$26,025 in suits for alienation and malicious prosecution. 
The trial court set aside the verdict as excessive. The Su-
preme Court of En'ors of Connecti·cut upheld the trial court 
in setting aside the verdict on the grund that "sympathy, 
prejudice or other inadmissible considerations" were re-
sponsible, but also held that the trial -court erred in failing 
to set aside the verdict conditionally, saying: 
"We think that the trial court should have exercised 
the discretion vested in it to condition its action, and 
the consequent retrials, upon plaintiff's refusal to ac-
cept a remittitur reducing each verdict to such sum as, 
in its judgment, would constitute just compensatory 
damages in each ·case. The practice of thus granting 
a new trial nisi, in certain cases where the damages 
awarded by the verdict are clearly excessive, is a bene-
ficial one to the parties and is in no sense a usurpation 
of the functions of the jury. (citing) Noxon v. Reming-
ton, 78 Conn. 296, 61 Atl. 963." 
It is pointed out in this case that under the laws of Con-
necticut punitive damages are limited in amount to the costs 
of litigation. 
In Lindenberger v. Klapp, 254 Ill. Appl. 192 (decided 
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in 1929') cited on page 21 of appellant's brief, a verdict of 
$90,000 reduced by the trial court to $45,000 was set aside 
on the ground of passion and prejudice. However, the facts 
in the Illinois case were that the plaintiff, both before and 
after the separation, continued to drink to excess and to live 
and associate with tmdesirable people, and he had been 
afflicted with venereal disease. 
In the case of Allen v. Rossi, (Maine) 146 Atl. 692, cited 
on page 21 of appellant's brief, the court colnmented on set-
ting aside the judgment that there was no evidence of the 
salary of the defendant, his age, his repute for wealth, his 
actual wealth or his property. 
Wood v. Miller (Wash), 265 Pac. 727, cited on page 21 
of appellant's brief, as pointed out by him, held a $20,000 
judgment excessive; but there the court pointed out that by 
the testimony of both, their relations prior to the alleged 
alienation were rather sordid no matter who was believed; 
they had no children, no hope of children, they had both 
been in jail, they had had repeated violent physical encoun-
ters, their home was a house of public entertainment and 
they had each been married before. Moreover, punitive 
damages we·re not recognized in Washington. 
Also ·cited in the same paragraph of appellant's brief 
are Essig v. Keating, 291 Pac. 323, and Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 6 P.2d 617, from the same jwisdiction. In the first 
case, the court reduced a judgment from $12,500 to $5,000, 
pointing out that the plaintiff "had become addicted to 
practices and vices" which must ultimately have led to a 
separation anyway, and that no punitive damages are rec-
ognized in that state. In the second ·case cited, the verdict 
was not reduced to $5,000 as stated by appellant, but to 
$2,500. However, the marriage was of only a year's dw--
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ation, the defendants were the parents of the husband and 
\vere sued by the wife. The court indicated that the evi-
dence was slight as to alienation and the loss by the wife in 
any Event was little that of "her shiftless, indolent, ir-
responsible and lazy young husband." Contrast this with 
the loss of plaintiff's wife in the case at bar, who had been, 
prior to her alienation, an attractive, loving, companionable 
and industrious wife and mother. 
The Idaho case of Summerfield v. Pringle, 144 P.2d 214, 
cited on page 22 of appellant's brief, where. a verdict as re--
duced by the appellate court to allow $20,000 compensatory 
and $1,000 punitive damages was sustained, involved a 
marriage of relatively short duration and the mother of the 
husband of plaintiff was the defendant. The rule is ex-
pressly recognized, however, that the fact that the evidence 
in an action for alienation is circumstantial does not impair 
its usefulness or deprive it of its potency. The different 
rule applying to parents also is stated to the effect that 
parents have a presumptive right to be interested in the 
affairs of their married children and to advise them con-
cerning such affairs and in order to establish their liability, 
it must be shown that the parents acted maliciously and 
with jntent to alienate the affections of the child. Dr. Old-
royd had no such presumed right; his status was a mere 
interloper without any semblance of justification or excuse, 
made doubly unjustifiable by the relation of doctor-patient 
on which it presumed. 
The summory of cases in 69 ALR, 1279, et. seq., con-
tains many of the cases cited by appellant and others not 
cited. The notable features of this annotation and the sup-
plemental decisions are that few, if any, of the cases re-
ported involve such strong evidence of the loss of an ac-
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complished and loving wife with its incidents of humilia-
tion and mental pain and suffering on the one hand, with 
circumstances ·of such persistent and unjustifiable inter-
ference on the other. The advice of the physician, Dr. Old-
royd, to his patient and friend when plaintiff consulted him 
as to the coldness of plaintiff's wife, that the situation should 
be analyzed to see what was the matter, when all the time 
defendant was making love to plaintiff's wife, is a situation 
that would be worthy of some tragic drama. 
Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 Pac. 605, cited by 
appellant on page 23 of his brief,·characterizes by way of 
dicta the $25,000 verdict therein awarded as "palpably ex-
cessive" but declined to pass upon the question of whether 
it could be considered the result of passion and prejudice. 
The facts involved in the present ·case are not comparable. 
In the case of Wheat v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., ---
Utah , 250 P .2d 9-32, cited by appellant to bolster 
his argument that the entire verdict should be set aside and 
not merely reduced, the verdict attacked in the Supreme 
Court was in fact sustained. The Court points out that 
mere e~cessiveness of a verdict, without mo~, does not 
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by passion 
or prejudice. Pauly v. McCarthy, 100 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 
123. In the Wheat case, this Court also quotes with ap-
proval the language of Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 Pac. 
423, that "in case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial 
court should prevail, otherwise this court will sooner or 
later find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and 
the trial court, in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the Constitution." 
To the same effect is the recent case of Merlene Lod-
der v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. and Richard White, de-
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cided by the Utah Supreme Court, being Supreme Court 
number 7809, and not yet published in the advance sheets. · 
In that case, the court states, "But we find no case where 
this Court has held as a matter of law passion and prejudice 
were shown merely by the excessive amount of the verdict.'' 
The jury heard the evidence, assessed the damages. 
The trial court did not consider the verdict excessive. We 
do not think it is, as to either compensatory damages or 
punitive damages. There is no indication of any passion or 
prejudice for or against either party. If the verdict might 
be considered excessive by some, including the defendant, 
it is only because different persons may differ as to their 
valuations. If this Court should have a different idea of 
damages and believe the verdict should be reduced it prob-
ably has the power to do so, but that would be no indication 
that the entire verdict should be set aside. But we earnestly 
believe that no reduction whatever is called for or would 
be justified and that any reduction would serve not the 
purpose of law or justice but only that of those who too 
lightly regard the value of the marriage relation. 
In the ·case of Wocxlhouse v. Woodhouse (1925), 99 
Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758, $125,000 damages in an alienation of 
affection suit were sustained 'by the appellate court as not 
excessive. The jury had awarded $465,000, of which $65,-
000 was for punitive damages and the trial ·court reduced 
the judgment to $125,000, of which $25,000 was punitive 
damages. In sustaining this award, the appellate court 
pointed out that both husband and wife were in the prime 
of life (as is the case with the Wilsons), and that (as was 
the case here) , there was every prospect of many years of 
a happy marriage but for the alienation. It was also true 
that the alienated spouse was well to do, but the court put 
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alienation, which find a comparison in those of Geraldine 
Wilson since, prior to her close association with Dr. Old-
royd, the jury was authorized to find that she was an ac .. 
complished, loving and personable mother and wife. 
The amount of the judgment is fully justified from ev .. 
ery standpoint, and should be permitted to stand WJimpaired. 
Point m. There is abundant evidence to sustain th.e ver-
dict against defendant and the court did not err in refusing 
to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict or in faD-
ing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was 
against t~ e'Vidence or on the ground that the verdict was 
excessive or given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. 
The appeHal'lt says that there js an absolute absence 
"· 
of any proof of financial loss to plaintiff. He misconceives 
the nature of the· loss for which recovery may be had, which 
is not limited to out .. of-pocket loss, but includes the far 
more important value of the conjugal rights and affections 
of which he was deprived, as wen as mental pain, suffering 
and humiliation proximately caused by defendant's wrong-
ful acts. He also asks what does the award of $50,000 com-
pensatory damages represent--it is pain and suffering, 
humiliation or loss of association with plaintiff's wife up to 
the time his wife obtained a divorce? "Does it include, as 
instruction No. 8 implies, disruption of his family life when 
his divorce from his former wife had become final more 
than six months prior to the time such instruction was 
given?" 
Defendant fails to recognize tllat the loss of conjugal 
rights up to the time of the divorce is only a small part of 
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the basis for damages, for the jury, as heretofore pointed 
out, was authorized to return damage for all loss, whether 
past, present or prospective, which they found proximately 
resulted from the wrongful acts of the defendant. Appel-
lant further questions the right to damages awarded be-
cause plaintiff had social contact with another woman ''dur-
ing the time he was the legal husband of Geraldine Beck 
Wilson." He fails to point out to the Court that any such 
contact was not only after the disruption of his home by 
Dr. Oldroyd but after the divorce case was tried. We sus-
pect that the law does not require one to become a total 
recluse after his wife has been taken away from him, as 
here, under penalty of losing his claim for damages; but be 
that as it may, there is absolutely nothing in the record 
that would either require or justify the jury in finding that 
the plaintiff was guilty of any improper, or any other as-
sociation, which in any way affected the damages awarded. 
The defendant's innuendo is groundless. 
The diatribe concerning the claimed ego of plaintiff, 
appearing on page 26 of appellant's brief, finds foundation 
only in the mind of the defendant and perhaps in the at-
titude of plaintiff's wife after her attitude had ibeen influ-
enced by the defendant. Certainly there is no justification 
for it in any evidence which the jury was bound to believe. 
Appellant on page 26 of his brief seems to admit that 
the damage awarded would be proper "where the affections 
of a woman who was madly in love with a kind, considerate 
and loving husband were stolen by one who pursued her 
and by gifts, blandishments ·and false accusations against 
her husband, induced her to give herself to him and de-
bauched her." We will let appellant's counsel involve the 
question of debauchery since we have chosen to let the cir-
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cumstances speak for themselves, but on the other points, 
the jury had the right, and we think by the evidence were 
required, to find at least the substance of what is outlined. 
Just because appellant in vindictiveness, disappointment or 
sheer determination to a void his responsibilities chooses to 
disparage the plaintiff now, does not mean that the jury 
had to believe his theory in arriving at their verdict. 
The plaintiff's evidence directly showed, admissions of 
the defendant indicated, and independent testimony cor-
roborated the fact, that Dale Wilson. was a kind, considerate 
and loving husband and that his wife was genuinely in love 
with him, had borne him two children, whom they were 
raising in an atmosphere of mutual love, respect and under-
standing, in a fine relationship that there was every indi-
cation would be permanent, and that the defendant, by tak-
ing advantage of his friendship for Dale Wilson and the lat-
ter's friendship for him, and the relations of physician and 
· patient, and physician and nurse, by gifts or promises of 
gifts, blandishments, love-making, concealment and pleas, 
did induce her to give her affection to him so that she was 
carried away by infatuation to such an extent as to make 
impossible the continuation of plaintiff's marriage, and so 
as to induce her to testify and argue for him at the trial, 
the alienation then being demonstrably complete beyond 
any doubt. 
Appellant contends on page 27 of his brief that the 
verdict was not against him because he alienated plaintiff•s 
wife, but "because defendant and plaintiff's wife were in-
fatuated with each other." We have never before heard 
it suggested that the infatuation of one married man for 
another man's wife was a justification for his breaking up 
a home. But if the inference is that this was a mere pas-
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sive infatuation, one needs only to look at the record, which 
shows a persistent, studied, concealed, determined and ag-
gravated program on the part of the defendant to deprive 
the plaintiff of his conjugal rights and to appropriate such 
rights for himself. 
Berger v. Levy, (Cal) 43 P.2d 610, cited on page 27 of 
appellant's brief, was not reversed and remanded for a new 
trial because of insufficiency of the evidence but primarily 
because the trial was had in the absence of the defendant. 
The language omitted from appellant's quotation from this 
case is revealing. Following the sentences first quoted by 
appellant from the opinion, the court says: 
"It is sufficient if it be shown that the conduct of a de-
fendant led to a separation of the spouses and was in-
tentional and wrongful; and it is no defense that such 
conduct was not the sole cause of the separation and 
loss of affection, proof that it was the procuring or con-
trolling cause being all that is required." 
Could anyone with reason ·contend that the defendant's 
action in making love to plaintiff's wife, in meeting her sur-
reptiously and kissing her repeatedly, in writing urgent love 
letters to her and instructing her as to their destruction, 
in arranging for their correspondence to be carried on 
through other addresses, or via his attorney so that their 
respective spouses would not know, in discussing and hold-
ing out substantial financial rewards to plaintiff's wife with 
the inference that they would be forthcoming only if she 
divorced plaintiff, with ·which plaintiff because of his modest 
financial condition could not hope to compete; in denying 
that he was writing or seeing Mrs. Wilson when he was ar-
ranging trysts with her, more conveniently because of his 
employment as their family physician, and in meeting her 
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to discuss and presumably to advise with respect to her di-
vorce case against plaintiff,--can it be justly contended 
that this action as shown by the record was not wrongful 
and was not a contributing cause in the alienation? And 
if it could, would anyone, except defendant, contend that 
the jury was bound as a matter of law to accept such con-
tention? 
The appellant generously conceded on page 28 of his 
brief that he "probably breached the social standard es-
poused by the trial judge and jury," but ·contends that such 
breach was not the cause of the alienation. We wonder if 
defendant still feels, as his actions seem to indicate, and his 
present arguments seem to confirm, that at most, his mak-
ing love to plaintiff's wife and the sordid concealments and 
episode's involving not only plaintiff but his own wife, were 
mere social errors giving rise to no responsibility or justi-
fying no legal remedies except a declaration that they were 
"a probable breach of the social standards of the trial judge 
and the jury." 
No court that we have ever been able to find has ever 
taken such a view, and it is a sad commentary on the ideas 
of the appellant concerning this Court that he supposes it 
would entertain any such views. We resent the appellant's 
reference to the trial judge and jury. It is true that they 
were not guided by defendant's liberal ideas on the accept-
ability of such conduct, but neither is the law. We are con-
fident that this ·Court, as well as the trial judge, will regard 
defendant's ·conduct as involving something more than mere 
social irregularities without responsibility. 
On pages 29 to 39 of appellant's brief, an apparent at-
tempt has been made to create confusion and conflict by 
taking sentences or other fragments of plaintiff's testimony 
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out of context and by interspersing them with conclusions 
and self-serving arguments without reference to the rule 
that in considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict the testimony favorable to the prevailing 
party must be taken as true with the reasonable inferences 
therefrom. Appellant ignores the preponderance of the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and would have this 
Court completely overlook it and decide the case on the in-
ferences and arguments which he advances. It would be 
a waste of effort to attempt to follow appellant as he jumps 
around in the record trying to discover and emphasize frag-
ments of evidence which might have been favorable to him 
had the jury adopted his theory. We can only refer to the 
record itself and to our statement of facts in which are set 
forth some of the controlling facts and circwnstances which 
defendant seeks to ignore. 
To build prejudice against the plaintiff, the appellant 
quotes excerpts from his t~timony concerning his threats 
to sue if defendant continued to interfere with his home, 
avoiding the fact that plaintiff had theretofore tried almost 
everything else to dissuade appellant from his apparent pur-
pose. When even these threats failed to deter the defend-
ant and he continued to carry on his program of romantic 
conquest and collaboration with plaintiff's wife to the 
threshold of her divorce, and ·beyond, the only thing that 
self-respect, a sense of justice, and ·normal and legitimate 
self-interest and protection would pernrlt was this legal ac-
tion. 
The foregoing is by way of answer to defendant's ar-
guments under his claim of the insufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict, and his contention that his motion 
for a directed verdict or motion for a new trial should be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
granted by virtue thereof. Actually, except for the argu .. 
ments and inferences so answered there is no serious at .. 
tempt made to show that the evidence was insufficient. 
There seems no real merit to defendant's contention and it 
is doubtful that any is really elaimed. Authorities hereto-
fore and hereinafter cited, as well as a number of cases 
cited in appellant's brief, seem to indicate rather conclu-
sively that the trial court committed no error in the respects 
mentioned, as do the following cases: 
McKinnon v. Chenoweth (~Oregon) 155 Pac. 2d 944. 
Burke v. Johnson, (Ky) 118 SW (2d) 731. 
Rank v. Kihm, (Iowa) 20 NW (2d) 72. 
Bryand v. ~c·arrier, 198 SE 619 (N·C). 
Kilgore v. Kilgore, (Fla) 19 So. 2d 305. 
Smith v. S·mith, 225 SW 2d 1001. 
Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 80 Pac. 2d. 183 (Cal.). 
Keyes v. Churchward, 61 A. (2d) 668 (Conn). 
Eklund v. Haekett, 179 Pac. 803 (Wash.). 
Point IV. There was adequate evidence to authorize sub-
mission of the question O;f punitive damages to the jury. 
Appellant next argues that there was no evidence of 
maUce, wilfulness or wantonness on the part of the defend-
ant to justify the submission of the question of punitive 
damages to the jury. He seems to take comfort from the 
fact that punitive damages are not allowed in some states 
and that the action for alienation of affections. has been 
abolished in others; these collateral matters have no bear-
ing,· the only pertinent questions being, whether punitive 
damages are allowable in Utah in alienation of affection 
actions, and, if so, whether the evidence is sufficient to jus-
tify submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. 
Defendant is finally forced to concede by his own ar-
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gument that punitive damages are recoverable in alienation 
of affection actions (p. 44 of appellant's brief) but takes 
the position that they can be sustained only in the event of 
actual malice. Defendant seems to interpret actual malice 
as some express threat or derogatory statement concern-
ing plaintiff. While it is true that Dr. Oldroyd was too care-
ful and well-advised to make such open statements, it is 
equally true that malice may be shown in many other ways 
than by name-calling. We believe it also true that some 
conduct such as that of which defendant was guilty, car-
ries malice as its fellow-traveler by the very nature of such 
conduct. 
The case of Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110 is cited 
by appellant and a quotation given which, itself, indicates 
that elements other than actual malice will authorize puni-
tive damages. The Adams case was an action for the con-
version of furniture and the court held that there was 
neither pleading nor proof to authorize the award of puni-
tive damages in that case. There are cases involving suits 
against parents for the alienation of the affections of their 
children, but the distinction between these and such cases 
as the instant one has been repeatedly pointed out. In the 
case of a parent, interference with a marriage may be pro-
per and consistent with lack of malice. Bradford v. Brad-
ford, (Ore) 107 P.2d 106; Monen v. Monen (S. D.) 269 N. 
W. 85. But the interference of a stranger with a marriage 
involves other principles. Eklund v. Hackett (Wash) 179 
Pac. 803. Even in the case of a parent it is held in the 
Monen case that malice means the intentional doing of a 
wrongful act without just cause or excuse. 
On page 44 of appellant's brief it is argued that "there 
is no intent, motive or design on the part of Dr. Oldroyd to 
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cause a lessening of Mrs. Wilson's affections for her hus-
band or to cause her to leave him", and that Dr. Oldroyd 
just "failed to give proper consideration to the possible con-
sequences of a display of affection for Mrs. Wilson." Fin-
ally, appellant relies on what he claims to be the general 
rule that there "must be present evil motive, actual malice, 
deliberate violence, oppression or fraud which elements are 
all conspicuously lacking in the case now before the Court." 
It seems unnecessary to argue the fine distinctions and 
inferences of appellant's brief as to the various rules gov-
erning punitive damages. By any standard the evidence 
was suffi,cient to authorize the submission of the question 
to the jury. There might be some force in appellant's ar-
gument if the evidence would permit only of a finding that 
the defendant without any improper acts on his part were 
pursued without his consent and encouragement, by Mrs. 
Wilson. But to indulge in such a contention, more than 
reasonable inference must be disregarded; express evidence 
must be ignored. Just because the defendant used conceal-
ment, secret letters, secret meetings, kisses and promises 
rather than violence or force does not mean his conduct 
was any less oppressive. However, violence, oppression or 
fraud are only examples of the forms of malice authorizing 
punitive damages. 
One rule as to the award of punitive damages in Utah 
is set forth in the case of Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 
Pac. 54, wherein the Supreme Court of Utah approved the 
rule as stated in 12 A. & E. Ency. L. (2nd Ed.) p. 28, as 
follows: 
"While the term 'gross' is constantly used in this con-
nection, many cases explain it by declaring that the 
rule of exemplary damages requires negligence in such 
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degree as to amount to wantonness and positive mis-
conduct, manifesting a conS{!ious disregard of the right 
of others and a reckless indifference to consequences. 
And so is ·believed to be the weight of authority." 
The Court in the Rugg case also quoted with approval 
the rule stated in the case of Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 
at page 210, 40 Pac. 499, where it was said: 
"To justify a recovery of exemplary damages, the act 
causing the injury must be done with an evil intent 
and with the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or with 
such a wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as 
evidences a ·wrongful motive." 
Where could there be a ·case that showed a more wan-
ton and reckless disregard of the, rights of another than the 
disregard by the defendant of the rights of the plaintiff in 
the instant case? The rule stated in the Rugg case, supra, 
as to exemplary damages is approved in the more recent 
Utah case of Calhoun v. ·Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 
146 p .2d 284. 
It is contended by appellant that there can be no puni-
tive damages because when it appeared that the Wilsons 
were going to separate, Dr. Oldroyd "actually interceded in 
the matter and attempted to repair the breach and to per-
suade Mrs. Wilson to return to her husband." The fact is 
that Dr. Oldroyd, when he was caught in his love affair, 
went through the motions by lip-service of saying that Mrs. 
Wilson should go back and that he would discontinue his 
love-making, but notwithstanding such protestations, con-
tinued to write to her, meet her in secret and carry on his 
romance, leading ineveitably to the breaking up of the 
home. To the original wrong, he added continued conceal-
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ment which aggravated rather than lessened the offense 
against plaintiff. 
The Illinois case of Eshelman v. Rawalt, 16 ALR 1311, 
131 NE 675, is referred to on page 42 of appellant's brief 
on the question of the nature of the "malice" that will au-
thorize the award of punitive damages. This case ques-
tions the amount of punitive damages therein awarded but 
does not question that punitive damages were recoverable 
and the decision turns more on the misconduct of counsel 
for which misconduct the judgment was expressly reversed. 
The doctrine of that case, with reference to punitive dam-
ages, is that they are allowable where "a wrong act is char-
acterized by circumstances of aggravation, such as wilful-
ness, wantonness, malice or oppression", which is an accu-
rate definition of defendant's acts here. They were assuredly 
wilful because even after plaintiff had pled with Dr. Oldroyd 
to leave his wife alone, Dr. Oldroyd continued with his 
wrongful interference and while he was assuring the plain-
tiff that he was not writing his wife· and would not see her, 
he not only was doing these things but was, by appeals, 
promises, protestations and kisses, carrying on his campaign 
with Geraldine Wilson. They were wanton because they 
displayed an absolute ··contempt and disregard for plain-
tiff's conjugal rights, and they were malicious and oppres-
sive.· 'because any such conduct is of necessity of that na-
ture. In his attitude toward plaintiff, as well as in his at-
titude toward his own wife, defendant displayed a ruthless-
ness and determination to carry on his romance with Ger-
a1dine Wilson which would brook no obstacle. 
The annotation following the case cited from 16 ALR 
beginning at page 1316, on the subject of "Punitive or Ex-
emplary Damages in Actions for Alienation of Affections or 
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Criminal Conversation", reflects the various statements of 
the rule, and few, if any, cases state the rule more narrow-
ly than appellant. Yet, under appellant's ·concept there 
seems no question but that punitive damages were proper. 
By the great weight of the authority, including that of Utah, 
it is sufficient if a wrongful act is done intentionally and 
knowingly with disregard of its injurious effect upon the 
other party. 
It is well stated in Butterfi~ld v. Ennis, (Mo) 186 S. ·w. 
1173: 
"It is true punitive damages are not allowed in the ab-
sence of malice. But the enticing away of another 
man's wife is an act inherently wrong and necessarily 
known to be wrong and if the alienation from the hus-
band is intentionally done, the law implies maHce from 
these facts.'' 
In narrowing the rules concerning punitive damages, 
appellant has perhaps been unduly influenced by some of 
the cases involving claimed alienation by a parent. There, 
a showing of express malice is frequently expected, since 
the marriage of a child does not terminate the right of the 
parent to interest himself in the welfare of such ·child and 
causing a breach of the marriage relation in good faith may 
not result in liability because of the legitimate interest of 
the parent; however, in respect to a stranger to the family 
relationship, whose only object is the gratification of his 
own romantic interest, the rule does not favor interference 
and the intentional and wilful nature of the act would indi-
\ 
cate malice. In either event, however, maUce may be shown 
by circumstantial evidence and is not dependent upon ~y 
admission of the wrongdoer, as appellant seems to contend. 
Wallace v. Wallace (Mont) 279 Pac. 374, 66 ALR 587. 
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In the case of Moore v. Grimes {Okla) 35 P.2d 944, the 
court commented: 
"Defendant requested certain instructions which were 
refused by the court, and it is contended that the re-
fusal was error. The instructions requested were appli-
cable only in cases where the plaintiff sues the parent 
or parents, or those standing in the relation of parents, 
of the husband, or wife, whose affections were alleged 
to have been alienated. There is a ~clear distinction 
between a case of this kind against the parent and one 
against a stranger. Parents are under obligation by 
the law of nature to protect their children from injury 
and relieve them when in distress. Their natural af-
fections prompt them to interest themselves in the wel-
fare of their children. Heisler v. Heisler (Iowa) 127 
N. W. 823. 
"A much stronger showing as to malice and intent is re-
quired in an action against a parent than in one against 
a stranger. But it has been held that an actual intent 
to alienate is not necessary if defendant's acts are in-
herently wrong and seductive and tend to and to have 
the effect complained of. 30 C. J. 1122." 
The appellant's brief (p 44) blandly asserts that "there 
is no intent, motive or design on the part of Dr. Oldroyd to 
cause a lessening of Mrs. Wilson's affection for her husband 
or to cause her to leave him . . the worst that can 
be said is that the doctor failed to give proper consideration 
to the possible consequences of a display of affection for 
Mrs. Wilson." May it not with reasonable accuracy be said 
that wantonness in general may be the failure to give pro-
per consideration to the possible consequence of a wrongful 
act? 
When a man makes love to another man's wife, ar-
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ranges with her by elaborate and premeditated planning 
to burn his letters and to send her letters through his at-
torney or others, \Varns her not to let her husband know, 
meets her in secret, holds out a promise of financial reward 
if and when a divorce is procured, and does other acts shown 
or inferred by the evidence, is the jury bound as a matter· 
of law to find that there is no intent, motive, malice, or de-
sign to lessen the affection of Mrs. Wilson for her husband 
or to interfere with the marriage? From time immemor-
able, and in the knowledge of all reasonable men, such con-
duct has tended to break up marriages. Few, if any, mar-
riages can survive such conduct for any length of time. 
Must the jury, contrary to the law and the common knowl-
edge of all humans, find that Dr. Oldroyd was just having 
some _good, clean fun without any intent to interfere? It 
is doubtful that the jury could have found this if they had 
been so ·advised, for such a finding in view of the undisputed 
record, we believe, would have been contrary to law. Is it 
possible that their findings as actually made, could be 
set aside because they failed to determine what Dr. Oldroyd 
now says they should have determined? We submit that 
defendant's objection to the award of punitive damages has 
no merit. 
Point V. The court did not err in permitting plaintiff to 
present evidence of financial wealth. 
The appellant indicates that this Court has not decided 
the question of whether evidence of wealth of the defendant 
is competent as going to the amount of punitive damages. 
While the appellant cites one case where he claims such evi-
dence was held not competent (Texas) he seems to concede 
the prevailing rule that it is; and the conclusion of his ar-
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gument is that if it be held that there was not sufficient evi· 
dence to justify the return of a verdict for punitive dam. 
ages, the court erred in receiving evidence of the wealth of 
the defendant.. This we concede, but as heretofore shown, 
there was adequate evidence to justify punitive damages; 
and we further call attention to the fact that the court most 
carefully and properly instructed the jury as to the rules 
concerning the award of punitive damages, concerning 
which instruction appellant has no valid complaint. The 
jury were told in instruction No. 9a (file 111) that if they 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend· 
ant wilfully and with gross and wanton disregard of plain· 
tiff's rights induced plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affec· 
tion from, and desert, the plaintiff an~ to give her love and 
affection to the defendant, they might award plaintiff puni· 
tive damages, and in such event as to punitive damages, 
might give consideration to the situation of the parties and 
the financial -condition of the defendant so far as shown by 
the evidence. 
The jury were further expressly told in the same in· 
struction that they must not be influenced by evidence of 
financi~il condition for any purpose except in detennining 
the amount of punitive damages in case they found that 
punitive damages should be assessed, and the jury were fur-
ther told that they must not be influenced by evidence of 
such financial condition in determining whether plaintiff 
was entitled to damages. The instruction was fair, proper 
and complete. No request for any different instruction on 
the subject was made by defendant. 
In Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 908(2), 
p. 555, may be found what is the prevailing rule as to the 
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admission of testimony as to the wealth and financial stand-
ing of the defendant in assessing punitive damages: 
"(2). When punitive damages are permissible, their 
allowance and amount are within the discretion of the 
trier of fact. In assessing such damages, the trier of 
fact can properly consider the character of ~efendant's 
act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff, 
which the defendant caused, or intended to cause, and 
the wealth of the defendant." 
In an action for alienation of affections, the jury is al-
lowed a wide latitude in fixing damages; the jury may award 
punitive damages and in fixing such damages may consider 
the wealth of the defendant. Kilgore v. Kilgore (Fla), 19 
So. 2d 305. 
The propriety of the receipt of evidence as to the finan .. 
cial condition of a defendant in cases in which punitive dam-
age.s are authorized as a means to assist in determining what 
a proper amount is as an example or punishment in any 
given case, is so generally recognized and approved in prac-
tice in this state as to admit of little doubt. In no such case 
of which we are aware has the admissibility of such evi-
dence been denied. In fact, the conclusion of defendant's 
argument under this point seems to concede this, and only 
advances the thought that if there were not sufficient evi• 
dence to justify the return of punitive damages, the court 
erred, not only in submitting the question to the jury but 
in allowing evidence of defendant's wealth to be received. 
Since there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the 
question of punitive damages, the receipt of the evidence in 
question was not error. 
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Point VI. (a) The court did not err in instructing the 
jury in instructions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, that they should 
find for the plaintiff if they found that the def~ndant per-
suaded the plaintiff's wife to desert or leave the plaintiff, 
or that defendant's acts were the· controlling cause in alien-
ating her affections. 
The objections to the instructions discussed only swn-
marily by the appellant under this heading seem to be that 
the instru-ctions or some of them are merely abstract in-
structions or are repetitious or that they were not justified 
by the evidence, there· being uncontradicted evidence, ac-
cording to defendant's claims, that there was no encourage-
ment by defendant for plaintiff's wife to leave plaintiff; 
and that it was error to submit to the jury the question of 
whether defendant was the controlling cause of any aliena-
tion because there was no evidence from which this might 
be found. 
No specific instructions are quoted and no ~citations to 
the record are set forth. Defendant's argument consists 
almost entirely of conclusions which we believe to be not 
supported by the record. 
Instruction No. 4, complained of by defendant, reads as 
follows: 
"4. You are instructed that in order to hold the de-
fendant liable you must find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that his acts or -conduct constituted the 
controlling cause in alienating the affection of plain-
tiff's wife or inducing her to desert or cease her asso-
ciation with plaintiff as his wife. If you believe that 
the acts or conduct of the plaintiff himself toward his 
wife or any other cause than the acts or conduct of 
the defendant constituted the controlling cause of 
plaintiff's wife's desertion of the plaintiff, then the de-
fendant should not be held liable." (File 106) 
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This instruction so complained of by appellant, oddly 
enough, is almost identical in substance with the instruc-
tion requested by the defendant in his request No. 4, which 
is as follows: 
"Request No. 4. You are instructed that in order to 
hold the defendant liable for his wrongful acts, if you 
find such wrongful acts, the acts of qefendant musy 
(sic) have been the procuring or controlling cause of 
the alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's wife. 
Defendant is not liable if the acts complained of did not 
alienate the affections of plaintiff's wife. Regardless 
of what defendant did which he should not have done 
hs is not liable unless such acts caused the alienation 
of affections of plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff cannot re-
cover damages from defendant if plaintiff's own mis-
treatment caused the loss of his wife's affections." 
(File 79) 
Again, in defendant's requests 11 and 17, the court was 
asked to instruct on the same theory and, in some respects, 
in the same language. Appellant should not now complain. 
If the instruction had not been given, appellant would want 
the judgment reversed because his theory in this respect 
was not presented. Moreover, such instruction is not an 
abstract instruction, as claimed by appellant, but was 
given with particular reference to the specific issue at the 
request of the defendant to present his theory of the case. 
Instruction No. 5 as given by the court reads: 
"5. You are further instructed that if you believe that 
the plaintiff's wife fell in love with or transferred her 
affection to the defendant without any affirmative in-
ducement or encouragement from the defendant, then 
the defendant should not be held liable herein. On 
the other hand, if you find that the defendant inten-
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tionally encouraged plaintiff's wife to bestow her af-
fections upon him or to withdraw her affection from 
the plaintiff and that this caused a separation between 
plaintiff and his wife and that without defendant's en-
couragement or inducement there would have been no 
separation between the plaintiff and his wife, then you 
should render your verdict for the plaintiff and award 
him damages in accordance with instructions herein-
after given." (File 106) 
This instruction is based upon defendant's requests 
numbered 5, 17 and 20, and other requests (File 80, 92, 95). 
It was invited by these requests, which as far as adopted 
by the instruction, were correct statements of the law. 
Merely because the court in the instruction also stated the 
converse of the proposition advanced by defendant does not 
render the instruction bad, but makes it more fair. There 
is nothing abstract about it and the evidence fully justified 
its being given. 
Instruction No. 6 will be quoted in full and discussed 
at greater length under the next subdivision of the brief. 
On the points it is attacked by appellant under his Point 
Six, however, i. e., that the instruction is abstract and not 
justified by the evidence, that it is repetitious, there seems 
no possible merit in appellant's present objections. 
Neither is instruction No. 7 abstract, needlessly repe-
titious or subject to the objection that the evidence did not 
justify its submission. It likewise was primarily invited by 
the requests of the defendant, and if it involves any repeti-
tion, it is the repetition of defendant's theory. 
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Instruction No. 7 reads: 
"7. In this case evidence has been given that the 
plaintiff's wife obtained a decree of divorce by court 
proceedings. You are instructed that this fact does 
not prevent plaintiff from recovering damages herein 
if you find from the evidence that the defendant, prior 
to such divorce, intentionally induced plaintiff's wife 
to transfer her affection to him or to desert or cease 
her association with the plaintiff as his wife. On the 
other hand, if you find from the evidence that plain-
tiff's wife determined to separate from the plaintiff be-
cause of acts or conduct of the plaintiff, and without 
wrongful encouragement or inducement from the de-
fendant, then the defendant should not be held liable. 
In any event you should not hold the defendant liable 
unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that wrongful acts or conduct on the part of the de-
fendant were the controlling cause of inducing the plain-
tiff's wife to withdraw her affections from the plain-
tiff or to cease her association with him as his wife." 
(File 107-108) 
The appellant does not expressly claim any error in in-
struction No.3, but uses the same argument on page 47 to 
49 of his brief with respect to No. 3 as he does with respect 
to Nos. 4, 5, and 7. The argument with respect to instruc-
tion No. 3 is likewise without merit. 
Neither of the ·cases cited by appellant on this phase 
of the case is in point. Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 Pac. 
653, was a suit for false arrest in which a general instruc-
tion was held inapplicable to a co-defendant. Jensen v. Utah 
Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349, criticizes abstract 
instructions having no direct relationship to the particular 
issues involved; but it is clear from the discussion in this 
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case that the instructions given in the case at bar were 
not abstract instructions but on the whole were in the con-
crete form recommended by this Court, giving to the jury 
what the law was as applied to the facts stated, if so found 
by the jury. We quote from the opinion in the Jensen case 
(p. 357): 
" . . The only guidance which the jury had was 
the mere abstract statement that, if an adult or a child 
goes upon the property of another without right to do 
so, he is a trespasser. But when a per.son has a right 
to do so, or more properly speaking, when he may do 
so without being characterized as a trespasser as a 
matter of law, the jury were given no guidance and 
were left to determine for themselves what in their 
judgment did, or did not, constitute a right. In that 
the jury were given an unbounded field. The court did 
not on ·any stated or assumed facts, if so found by the 
jury, direct them as to the legal effect thereof as to 
the question of trespass. 
"As a general rule a trial court should not leave the 
jury to apply more general principles of law to a case, 
as here was done by the defendant's request. The 
court should give the jury what the law is as applied 
to the facts either stated or assumed and if so found 
by the jury. The rule is well settled that instructing 
a jury as a mere abstract or general statement as to 
the law should be avoided and that all instructions 
should be applicable to evidence on either one or the 
other of the respective theories of the parties." 
No substantial departure from these principles is indi-
cated. Neither error nor prejudice has been shown by de-
fendant as concerns the instructions in question. 
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Point VI. (b) The court did not err in instruction No. ~ 
in recognizing the possibility of a reconciliation be.tween 
man and \\ife, and thfl appellant's objection dwells with 
only a part of the instruction whereaS the entire instruc-
tion, when considered with the other instructions of the 
court, is proper !and in any event could not have been preju-
dicial. 
It is interesting to note appellant's incongruous argu-
ment on this phase of the case. In effect it is now conceded, 
in an attempt to gain a point, that his contention that there 
was no competent evidence to sustain the verdict, is with-
out merit. Appellant says (pp. 49-50), ''If Dale Wilson's 
testimony is to be believed, there was no strained relation-
ship between himself and wife prior to that time (prior to 
the time Mrs. Wilson became well acquainted with Dr. Old-
royd) and only on such a basis could the jury have found 
any substantial damages in the case." Under his previous 
argument defendant contended without qualification that 
there was no evidence to support the award of substantial 
damage. 
We may say that the great preponderance of the· evi-
dence, both from plaintiff and from independent witnesses, 
was that Dale and Geraldine Wilson were most affectionate 
and happy prior to Dr. ·Oldroyd's intervention. Appellant 
now seems to concede at least that there is substantial evi-
dence from which the jury had a right to believe that no 
strained relationship before existed, so that the remaining 
question raised by appellant is whether instruction No. 6 in 
connection with the other instructions of the ~court preven-
ted a fair determination of this issue, or whether it was oth-
erwise prejudicial. 
The quotation of instruction No. 6 in appellant's brief 
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is incomplete, out of context and therefore misleading. We 
quote the instruction in full: 
"6. The defendant eontends in this case that Geral-
dine Beck Wilson had ceased to have affection for the 
plaintiff prior to the time of the acts complained of 
and that therefore the defendant cannot be held liable 
for alienating her affections from plaintiff. In regard 
to this contention, you are instructed that so long as 
the marriage status continues between a husband and 
wife, the law presumes that there is a possibility of a 
reconciliation between the parties even though they 
have become estranged or have had marital differences. 
It is therefore wrongful and unlawful for another man 
to court or make love to a married woman or to wil-
fully encourage her to give up her affection, if any, for 
her husband, and if he does this and thereby causes 
the wife to give up her affection, if any, for her hus-
band, or to desert or refuse to live with her husband, 
then he is liable in damages to the husband." (File 
107). 
Almost the entire basis of appellant's attack on this 
instruction _is the quotation from the case of Buckley v. 
Francis, supra, presented on page 51 of appellant's brief. 
It is submitted that the case cited is not in point; and that 
there is no doctrine therein announced which vitiates the 
instruction in the instant case; that the sta. tement of the 
trial court herein when considered in connection with the 
other instructions given, was correct, and in any event, that 
the instruction was not prejudicial to the defendant. Un-
der any reasonable view we do not think it could have been 
prejudicial, but we go further, and assert that it is a proper 
and correct statement of the law. 
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In plaintiff's request No. 14, he requested the court to 
instruct, among other things, as follows: 
"You are instructed that the mere fact that a husband 
and wife are not living together at the time does au-
thorize a third party to wilfully alienate the affections 
of the wife from the husband for the husband has the 
right to endeavor to effect a reconciliation or reunion 
free from, and without, any unlawul alienation of the 
affections of his wife from hi·m." (File 48) . 
Instruction No. 6 given by the court, while not using 
the form of this request, involved the same principle. The 
use of the term "presumption" was simply as a means of 
indicating that the marriage relation is entitled to protec-
tion from unlawful interference based upon the possibility 
mentioned. If the law is not as stated in instruction No. 6, 
any person with impunity could make love to a married 
woman or turn her against her husband had there there-
tofore been friction or an estrangement between them. The 
reason that this is not lawful is that possibility of a recon-
ciliation which the law always recognizes. 
The converse of this instruction would mean that a 
married woman separated from her husband is open game 
for anyone who wants to take her out or make love to her 
and that her husband cannot ·complain. If the husband 
may complain, it is only because of the possibility that he 
might affect a reconciliation or a reunion and that the law 
presumes in all cases that there is such a possibility. It 
should be noted that the instruction does not say that there 
is a presumption that there is affection or that liability will 
result. What it does say is that it is wrongful for another 
man to court or to make love to a married woman or to wil-
fully encourage her to give up her affection, if any, for her 
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husband. Can this proposition be questioned? Can it be 
said under any circumstances involved here that it was 
rightful and lawful for the defendant to court or make love 
to Mrs. Wilson while the marriage relationship existed? 
The proposition may be stated with like effect as follows: 
There is a-possibility of reconciliation and that therefore in 
any case a stranger should not act to foreclose that possi-
bility by courting or making love to an.other man's wife. 
Or we may say that there is a presumption of such recon-
ciliation but whatever reason is assigned, or in whatever 
form, the court, as was its duty, announced the law that it 
is wrongful for one man to court or to make love to another 
man's wife, something that even now the defendant at least 
inferentially concedes. The jury, however, had left to it, 
entirely free from any presumption, the question of whether 
such conduct was the controlling cause of any alienation 
and if so, as to whether any damage resulted. 
If this is not the law, then our whole attitude and con-
cept With respect to marriage, family and home in this state 
will be broken down. To be instrumental in such break-
down would be of dubious distinction to the very Courts 
which heretofore have been the bulwarks of the institution 
of marriage. If it is the law, the instruction was proper, 
especially in view of the latter part of the instruction which 
appellant omitted from his brief, ". . . . . it is therefore 
wrongful and unlawful for another man to court or make 
love to a married woman or to wilfully encourage her to 
give up her affection, if any, for her husband, and if he does 
this and thereby causes the wife to give up her affection, 
if any, for her husband, or to desert or refuse to live with 
her husband, then he is liable in damages to the husband." 
The court in no sense forecloses the jury from determining 
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whether the acts of the defendant caused any damage. 
They were told that if the defendant made love to, or cour-
ted, plaintiff's wife that was wrongful, the mention of the 
presumption simply being the reason for such statement, 
but the instruction left to them the determination of wheth-
er this was the proximate cause of her giving up her affec-
tion, if any, or deserting or refusing to live with her hus-
band. Merely ~because in the beginning of the instruction 
"presumption" was used, appellant has seized upon the word, 
as a mere word, in an attempt to make the instruction some-
thing that it does not even suggest when the entire instruc-
tion is read. 
Moreover, the entire instructions must be read and con-
sidered as a whole; the theories of the appellant were fully 
presented and when it came to the presentation of one of 
appellant's theories, to-wit: that if there were any difficulty 
between a married man and his wife, a stranger to the mar-
riage could make love, court or interfere to his heart's con-
tent and· such acts would not ~be wrongful, the court was 
obliged to state the law to the jury, that no matter what, 
if any, troubles there were, since the possibility of a recon-
ciliation always must be, and is, recognized by the law, out-
side interference is not lawful, and if such outside interfer-
ence of the nature described does in fact prevent a recon-
ciliation and alienates the affections of the wife from the 
husband, there is liability. As pointed out above, the in-
structions left to the jury the question of whether there was 
any such interference, whether it resulted in an alienation 
or desertion, and if so, the amount of the damages, if any. 
In addition thereto, a number of other instructions par-
ticularly emphasized in appellant's behalf his theories of 
defense and gave those theories specific application in. con-
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crete form, removing any possibility of misunderstanding. 
·Fbr example, in instruction No. 7, the jury were told: 
".. . . . On the other hand, if you find from the 
evidence that plaintiff's wife determined to separate 
from the plaintiff because of the acts or conduct of the 
plaintiff, and without wrongful encouragement or in-
ducement from the defendant, then the defendant 
should not be held liable. In any event you should not 
hold the defendant liable unless you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that wrongful acts or con-
duct on the part of the defendant were the controlling 
cause of inducing the plaintiff's wife to withdraw her 
affection from the plaintiff or to cease her association 
with him as his wife." (File 107-108). 
Again in instruction No.-5, the jury were told: 
"If you believe that the plaintiff's wife fell in love with, 
or transferred her affection, to the defendant without 
any affirmative inducement or encouragement from 
the defendant, then the defendant should not be held 
liable herein." (File 106). 
In instruction No. 4, the court said, among other things~ 
that: 
"If you believe that the acts or conduct of the plain-
-tiff himself toward his wife, or any other cause than 
the acts or conduct of the defendant constituted the 
controlling cause of plaintiff's wife's desertion of plain-
tiff, then the defendant should not be held liable." (File 
106). 
Again, in instruction No. 3, the jury were instructed: 
"Unless you find from the preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant intentionally encouraged and 
induced the plaintiff's wife to give to him, the defend-
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ant, her love and affection, or to abandon her a,ssocia-
tion with the plaintiff as his wife or to withdraw her 
affection from the plaintiff, then your verdict on plain-
tiff's complaint should be for the defendant, no cause 
of action." (File 105-106). 
The court was exceedingly fair, if not generous, toward 
the defendant in presenting very strongly against plaintiff 
all of defendant's theories that had any possible merit. 
However, the defendant apparently wished the court to go 
further and approve the pattern which obviously had been 
designed in the mind of the defendant as a sure means of 
avoiding liabiliay for his romantic association with plain-
tiff's wife. 
Dr. Oldroyd testified that his attorney had told him 
what to say to Mr. Wilson (517, 518). It is true, he added, 
that it was to tell the truth, but the jury was authorized to 
find at least that the defendant, despite any injunctions of 
his counsel, did not tell the whole truth. He apparently 
had been advised not to be seen alone with Mrs. Wilson. He 
apparently was conferring and corresponding with Mrs. Wil-
son concerning the case, as ~well as on personal matters, and 
it is no wonder that she so steadfastly attempted to support 
his theory that there could be no liability because she was 
not, as she claimed, affectionate toward Dale even before 
the defendant's interference. The defendant was carrying 
on correspondence with Mrs. Wilson through other people 
(60, 61, 62), and advised the destruction of all correspon-
dence (61, 62). He apparently had been warned that he 
should not give any money or property to Mrs. Wilson while 
she was Dale's wife; at least he said he would like to but 
couldn't as long as she was Dale's wife (544, 545). If he 
would state this to his own wife, it is a fair inference that 
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he had told Mrs. Wilson that when she was no longer plain-
tiff's wife he would do something for her. 
All in all, the defendant had ·what he, no doubt, re-
garded as a perfect formula for carrying on an affair with 
another man's wife without liability. The love-making 
would be discreet and secret. The wife would testify that 
she didn't love her husband anyway, and if the court could 
be induced to instruct the jury that if there were any fric-
tion between the Wilsons before defendant's interference, 
such interference would be lawful and proper, the formula 
would be complete. What the defendant failed to take into 
consideration was that whether there is great or little af-
fection between husband and wife, no stranger to the mar-
riage can rightfully or lawfully court or make love to the 
wife. It is true that there may be great or little affection 
and if one alieantes such affection the degree thereof will 
determine the amount of damages, if any, as found by the 
jury. It is also true that the existence of affection, if any, 
is a question o[ fact and such affection will not be presumed. 
These factors were all recognized in the instructions and 
they were left to the jury's determination. However, the 
defendant wished the trial court, and now wishes this Court, 
to go further and say that if there were difficulty between 
husband and wife, such pre-existing difficulty would make 
interference with the marriage relation rightful and lawful. 
This is not the law, and the ·court in instruction No. 6 sim-
ply recognized that such interference would not be rightful 
or lawful because, among other things, of the possibility of 
a reconciliation even though there may have been some pre-
vious estrangement. The instruction in this respect was 
adverse to plaintiff, if anything, assuming as it did that 
there was prior estrangement when the great preponderance 
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of the evidence was to the contrary. However, the jury 
was left to determine whether the defendant by any un-
lawful love-making contributed as a controlling cause to 
the separation and loss of affection, and as to the amount 
of the damages, if any. The instruction was proper, de-
prived defendant of no right or defense, was not prejudicial 
to him in any event, and defendant is in no position to com-
plain. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
no error is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard 
any error or defect which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. This principle was recognized in view 
of technical error, in upholding the judgment in Fowler v. 
Medical Arts Building, 112 Utah 367, 188 P.2d 711. In the 
instant case there was not even a technical error since the 
defendant had no right to have the jury told that love-mak-
ing with plaintiff's wife was either lawful, rightful or pro-
per; but in any event by repeated instruction, both in No. 
6 and others, the jury was furthermore told that unless they 
found that defendant's love-making, however wrongful, was 
the controlling cause of the break-up of plaintiff's marriage, 
they should find for the defendant. 
The case of Buckley v. Francis, supra, exclusively re-
lied upon by appellant in this phase of the argument, turns 
upon a different point than that involved in this case. The 
question of the existence of affection is a question of fact, 
which might go both to the question of liability and the 
question of the extent of damages. This Court has held that 
it was improper for the jury to be told to presume affection, 
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as this question should be determined from the evidence. 
No instruction of the court in the instant case instructed the 
jury to this effect, but on the contrary, the jury was told 
respecting this phase that if they found that the loss of af-
fection was from some other cause, they should find for the 
defendant, and if. his acts were not the controlling cause of 
the estrangement, which it was admitted existed at the 
trial, they should find for the defendant. 
If the court had directly said that it is the law that 
intermeddling with a marriage through love-making with 
the wife by a stranger to the marriage is wrongful notwith-
standing that there are difficulties between her and her 
husband, so long as the marriage continues, among other 
reasons, because there may be possibilities of a reconcilia-
tion, all of defendant's present arguments would be obvi-
ated since the mere word "presume" or "presumption" is 
endowed by him with some unacceptable connotation, not 
only in the sense passed upon by Utah Court in previous 
cases, but in every instance of the use of the term. Y,et, 
the court's instruction had the same meaning as if the term 
were not used. 
In Moelleur v. Moelleur (Mont), 173 Pac. 419, many of 
the rules involved in the case at bar are treated by the court 
in upholding a verdict of both compensatory and punitive 
damages. We quote from the opinion: 
"The rules of law governing an action of this charac-
ter are well stated: 
"(a) This action cannot be maintained if it appears 
that Dr. Moelleur voluntarily bestowed his affections on 
Mrs. Reynolds, the latter doing nothing wrongful to 
win them (citing authorities). 
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"(b) Even though plaintiff's conduct towards her hus~ 
band was a subsidiary cause of alienation, she is not 
barred from recovery; but the fact of their domestic 
trouble might be considered by the jury in mitigation 
of damages. Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wash. 480, 85 Pac. 
42, 7 Ann Cas 687 and note 689; Baird v. C'arle, 157 
Wis. 565, 177 NW 834; Hadley v. Heywood, 121 Mass. 
236. 
"(c) Even though there had been estrangement be-
tween plaintiff and her husband, so long as they re-
mained husband and wife, plaintiff had the right tor~ 
ly upon the possibility of reconciliation; and defendant 
had no right to intermeddle, and if she did so, she must 
answer for the consequences. Rott v. Goehring, 33 NiD 
413, 157 NW 294, LRA 1916E 1086, Ann Cas 1918A 
643, and note 647; Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322, 85 Atl. 
620, 43 LRA (NS) 332; 13 RCL 1465. 
"The jury was authorized to believe the evidence of-
fered on behalf of plaintiff and refuse to accept defend-
ant's theory of the case. In this view we assume that 
plaintiff's version was accepted, and if the evidence of-
fered in her behalf, with the legitimate inference to be 
drawn from it will justify a verdict in her favor, we 
are not at liberty to interfere . . . . 
"In Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 32 Am. Rep. 
397, it is said: 'The term malice as applied to torts does 
not necessarily mean that which must proceed from 
a spiteful, malignant or revengeful disposition, but a 
conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from 
an ill-regulated mind, not sufficiently cautious before 
it occasions an injury to another. If the conduct of the 
defendant was unjustifiable and actually caused the in-
jury ,complained of by plaintiff, which was a question 
for the jury, malice in law would be implied from such 
conduct.' 
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''This is the rule recognized and enforced by the courts 
generally. Boland v. Stanley, 88 Ark. 562, 115 SE 163, 
129 Am. St. Rep. 114; Sickler v Mannix, 68 Neb. 21, 93 
NW 1018, 3 Words and Phrases (2d Ed) 224, and un-
der it the question of the existence of malice was prop-
erly submitted to the jury." 
McKinnan v. Chenoweth (Ore) 155 P.2d 944, holds that 
in an action for alienation of affections of plaintiff's wife, 
plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that he need not show 
love and affection for his wife, that unpleasantness of their 
home life would not justify the defendant in intermeddling 
with plaintiff's domestic affairs and that plaintiff was en-
titled to a verdict if his wife would have remained with him 
but for defendant's wrongful acts; whether defendant's in-
termeddling with plaintiff's domestic affairs was a control-
ling cause of any alienation, was question for the jury, and 
that an instruction that the verdict should go for plaintiff 
if defendant's acts were intentional and the controlling cause 
of the alienation was proper. It was further held that mis-
conduct of plaintiff's husband will not palliate the offence 
of enticing of a wife's affections, although domestic unhap-
piness and discord not brought about by defendant, may 
serve to mitigate damages. It is further held that the dec-
laration of a deserting wife in defendant's absence are ad-
missible to prove the state of her affections and her motive 
and effect produced upon her mind by defendant's conduct 
notwithstanding that such declarations involve statements 
of acts done or words spoken by the defendant, but that 
declarations of the wife in absence of the defendant are in-
admissible if they constitute nothing but a recital or narra-
tive of what has been done or said, and are not a spontan-
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eous manifestation of the then existing emotions which in-
spired and produced the declarations. 
Monson v. Solace, supra, passes on another issue in-
volved in the case at bar.. We quote from pages 1104-1105 
of the opinion: 
"It is appellant's apparent contention that if the di-
vorce which it is alleged was obtained was actually ob-
tained on grounds which existed independently of the 
statements which defendant caused to ·be conveyed to 
the wife, then there is no cause of action stated. Such 
is not the law. It may be a defense to such an action 
that plaintiff himself, caused the alienation or that the 
affections ·were voluntarily withdrawn by plaintiff's 
spouse. However, even though there had been an es-
trangements, so long as they remained husband and 
wife, a plaintiff has the right to rely upon the possi-
bility of reconciliation, and any one who intermeddles 
and thus prevents a reconciliation, must suffer for the 
consequences.'' 
A husband's ill treatment of his wife was no justifica-
tion for, or palliative of, defendant's conduct, causing or 
contributing to husband's loss of his wife's affections. 
Squire v. Hill, 66 P.2d 822, 100 Colo 226. It is also held in 
this case that while the presumption that a husband living 
with his wife has her affection could be overthrown, yet the 
matter was properly submitted to the jury under an in-
struction that "if you believe that plaintiff has lost the love 
of his wife and that the acts and ·conduct of the defendant 
were the procuring or contributing cause therefor, you 
should find for the plaintiff, notwithstanding that you may 
believe that there were other contributing causes." 
In Summerfield v. Pringle (Idaho) 144 P.2d 214, the 
court pointed out that the whole defense could be summar-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
80 
ized by the contention that the affections in question had 
been lost before the wrongful acts of the defendant. This 
contention was rejected by the court. The following instruc-
tion was held to be proper: 
"12. You are instructed that although the marriage 
of a child does not terminate the right of a parent to 
interest herself in a child's welfare or happiness, and 
that a parent may cause a -breach in marital relations 
for good cause and in good faith, and that the law pre-
sum·es that the advice, acts and conduct of a parent to-
wards a child is in good faith, such presumption may 
be overcome by evidence that the interference on the 
part of such parent is unwarranted, without excuse or 
reason induced by improper motives." 
In no case that we have seen, however, has it been pre-
sumed or indicated that interference with a marriage by a 
stranger to the marriage bent on ,making love to the wife 
is anything but wrongful. In view of the law on the sub-
ject, the instruction as a whole and the other instructions 
of the court, there was no error in instruction No. 6, and 
in any event if any hyper-technical exception could be ta-
ken to its wording in any respect no prejudice could have 
been suffered by the defendant. 
Point VI. (c) The court did not err in instructing the 
jury with respect to punitive damages in instruction No. 
9(a). 
The appellant's attacks under the corresponding point 
in his brief ·are that the evidence did not authorize submis-
sion of this issue, and that the instruction itself was not a 
proper or complete definition of when punitive damages 
were proper. The first basis has already been discussed 
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under Point IV herein, and we will now deal primaiily with 
the latter argument. The substance of appellant's argument 
is that the term "wilful" was not defined in the instruction 
and therefore might have been held by the jury to cover 
mere acts of simple negligence. As appellant has done in 
some of his other arguments on instructions, he here has 
selected a fragment of one instruction out of context and 
has predicated his entire argument thereon. The instruc-
tion on punitive damages, we think, limited punitive dam-
ages more narrawly than the interests of the plaintiff and 
the law would justify. It was more favorable to defendant 
than it should have been, since it predicated the right to 
punitive damages upon wrongful acts, if any, found to be 
in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of plaintiff. 
We believe that if the acts were intentionally done, consid-
ering their nature, that would be sufficient foundation for 
punitive damages, particularly since the very nature of the 
defendant's acts themselves was of a character per se to 
authorize punitive damage. But the court instructed the 
jury more favorably to the defendant, as follows: 
"The plaintiff in this case, in addition to seeking a judg-
ment for compensatory damages, is also seeking to re-
cover punitive or exemplary damages. Punitive or ex-
emplary damages may be awarded to a party over and 
above an amount sufficient to compensate him for his 
injury if it is shown that the other party has been guil-
ty of gross or wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights. 
They are allowable under the law as a punishment for 
wilful and wanton wrongdoing and to set an example 
to deter others from similar wilful and wanton acts. 
If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff is en-
titled to compensatory damages in accordance with the 
evidence and instructions of the court, and then it will 
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be your duty to consider and determine from the evi-
dence and under these instructions, whether or not the 
plaintiff is also entitled to receive punitive or exemplary 
damages. If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant wilfully and with gross and 
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights induced the plain-
tiff's wife to withdraw her affection from and desert 
the plaintiff and give her love and affection to the de-
fendant, you may then award the plaintiff such punitive 
damages as you, in your sound judgment and honest 
judgment, believe will be proper under the circumstan-
ces shown by the evidence. In fixing the amount of 
punitive damages, if you find that any should be awar-
ded, you should consider the extent of culpability and 
the situation and relation of the parties and you may 
give consideration to the financial condition of the de-
fendant so far as shown by the evidence. 
"The court further instructs you, however, that you 
must not be influenced by evidence of the financial con-
dition of the defendant for any other purpose except 
in determining the amount of punitive damages, in case 
you find that punitive damages should be assessed. 
You must not be influenced by evidence of the plain-
tiff's financial condition in determining whether or not 
the plaintiff is entitled to damages, either compensa-
tory or punitive." 
The instruction of the court seems entirely consistent 
with Restatement of Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 908, p. 554. 
The comparatively late case of Calhoun v. Universal 
Credit Co., 106 Utah 155, 146 P.2d 284, refers with appro-
val to the rule that in order to award punitive damages, the 
party must know that the act is wrongful and must do it 
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intentionally without just cause or excuse. The court in 
the instant case \Vent beyond this, and required a showing 
that the defendant's acts were done wilfully and in gross 
and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights. The jury could 
not have thought such language to cover a mere negligent 
act as contended by defendant. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
on what theory defendant claims any of the intentional, 
planned acts of defendant could be merely negligent. In no 
sense could the jury have been misled as the very nature 
of the acts on which basis recovery was had characterized 
them. Seductive acts which alienate the affections of an-
other's wife infer the actor's purpose because in the eyes of 
the law a man intends the natural and probable consequen-
ces of his acts. In this connection we also refer to the au-
thorities considered under Point IV, and to the case of Ev-
ans v. Gaisford, Utah , 247 P.2d 431. There 
is a vast difference between these cases where mere negli-
gence may be involved and where the acts themselves con-
stitute wilful disregard of the rights of others, as here. See 
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 Pac. 54. 
The instruction of the court was ·consistent with the 
controlling principle, its language was readily understand-
able, and in general usage and was full, fiair and proper. 
No essential definitions ·were omitted and no request for any 
further definition was submitted by defendant. 63 Am.- Jur., 
Sec. 630, pp. 489-490; Parry v. Hiarris, 93 Utah 317, 72 Pac. 
(2d) 1044. No error, possible misunderstanding, or preju-
dice is indicated. 
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Point Vll. The court did not err in admitting or excluding 
evidence. (a) The ~court was not in error in excluding evi-
dence regarding events occurring during Geraldine WU-
so,n's marrie·d life with plaintiff for the reason that the 
proffered evidence was hearsay or confidential communi-
cations, and for the further reason that the same evidence 
was brought out by the same witnesses in response to other 
questions. 
The appellant sets out a collection of brief excerpts 
from questions, objections and rulings covering ten pages of 
his brief and then concludes that the court erred, citing 
cases having no relevancy to any particular question, ignor-
ing the varied bases of the ruling, failing to point out any 
resulting prejudice and avoiding the fact that on almost ev-
ery point, by reason of repetition of questions, reframing 
of them, re-direct examination, or other means, the evi-
dence referred to was permitted to go in. 
That any such rulings were without prejudice is abun-
dantly clear and in almost every case the rulings were cor-
rect from both technlcal evidence rules and common sense 
standpoints. 
Defendant in the first place contends on page 55 of his 
brief that the court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection 
to the question of whether at a given time Dale and she 
"were getting along all right." This question was altogether 
too general, and would have permitted incompetent testi-
mony of confidentiol communications. However, the de-
fendant was permitted to get into the record whatever he 
desired to concerning the claimed attitude of Mrs. Wilson 
concerning her husband when a proper foundation was laid 
and questions calling for competent evidence were asked 
(3191 320, 329, 330, etc.). 
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The next reference is made to the court's sustaining 
an objection on the ground the question was too general 
and no time fixed. This ruling was entirely proper and 
moreover, immediately following, by specific questions, all 
of the details were brought out (331, et seq). 
The objections to the duplicitous questions on page 330 
\Vere properly sustained, and no authority or reason is cited 
in appellant's brief to the contrary. 
The question of what plaintiff was "obliged to do" was 
sustained on the ground that it called for a conclusion (330) 
but then the circumstances of her claimed lack of concen-
iences were fully gone into (331). 
The appellant claims error in the ruling of page 336 
of the transcript on the question of whether divorce was 
discussed in 1943 or 1944 but entirely omits the following 
proceedings immediately following the ruling of the court: 
MR. SHiERMAN CHRISTENSON: ''If the court 
please, I believe we will withdraw that objection. 
THE COURT: You may answer. 
A. Yes we did" (And this witness was then per-
mitted to testify to just what she claimed was said 
about a divorce.) 
This is typical of appellant's objections to rulings. In 
almost every instance, a ruling is selected, often based on 
the mere form of the question, and error charged, when 
thereafter the same evidence is received, often in greater 
detail than was originally called for. 
This especially applies to the striking out of Mrs. Wil-
son's volunteer answer to the effect that "Dr. Oldroyd ·al-
ways encouraged me to stay with my husband . ; . .", 
and the sustaining by the court of the objection to the ques-
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tion, "Did he ever encourage you to stay with your hus-
band?." on the ground that question leading. Appellant 
on page 57 of his brief urged these rulings as reasons for 
reversing the case. He entirely ignores the subsequent 
rulings admitting in full all claims of any such conversations 
when foundations of time and place were fixed. The court 
showed extreme liberality in permitting all manner of 
claimed conversations on this point in the presence of the 
plaintiff to be related by Mrs. Wilson (341-343). Follow-
ing the material on page 57 of appellant's brief last above 
referred to, appellant says: 
"The witness was asked: 
'''Did he ever say anything to you with respect to 
staying with your husband?' 
"The court directed the witness to say 'yes' or 'no'. 
(p. 57. of appellant's brief.) 
The record actually shows that when this question was 
asked, the court simply said "You may answer 'yes' or 'no' 
to that question." The witness answered "Yes", and the 
court denied plaintiff's motion to strike the answer on the 
ground that no foundation had been laid and by reason of 
its being hearsay. So actually, instead of the ruling being 
against the defendant, it was adverse to plaintiff, and im· 
mediately following, over plaintiff's objection, the witness 
was permitt~ to recount all details of such alleged con-
versation ·whether out of the presence of the plaintiff or 
not. 
The striking out of the latter part of Mrs. Wilson's 
answer on transcript page 342, complained of by defendant, 
was clearly proper. She had already assumed to give her 
testimony as to all conversations dealing with the matter 
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and then in connection with one of them she added as a 
purely voluntary statement, "He has always encouraged 
me to stay with Dale." 
It is apparent that the alienation accomplished by the 
defendant so continued at the time of the trial that Mrs. 
Wilson was anxious, ready and willing not only to testify 
for Dr. Oldroyd but to attempt to argue his ~case by re-
peated volunteer conclusions. Many of them were left in 
the record. The jury had the right to judge her testimony 
with all the other evidence in the case, and certainly was 
not bound to accept it. On the other hand, the court just 
as certainly was not obliged in every case to permit her vol-
untary arguments and conclusions to remain as evidence. 
It would be unduly extending this brief to further ex-
amine point by point under this division of the argument 
the ruling which appellant has singled out as erroneous. 
Many of the rulings are fragmentary and out of context. 
Some appear from appellant's brief to have been entirely 
correct from appellant's own statement and in every in-
stance, a reading of the transcript will show that no com-
petent evidence in favor of appellant was precluded. In not 
a single instance has appellant pointed out any evidence 
1hat was not ultimately received when proper questions 
were asked. Defendant points to discussions between court 
and counsel out of the presence of the jury during the time 
the court was endeavoring to as'Certain the points sought 
to be reached and the proper forms of questions, as preju-
dicial rulings, whereas in every phase of the case defendant 
was permitted to place before the jury all. competent evf-
dence concerning the relations of plaintiff and his wife and 
all other material testimony, together with a good many of 
Mrs. Wilson's biased conclusions, reasons and arguments 
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with which she attempted to support defendant's thesis that 
there was no affection to be alienated -by defendant. 
In the case of Smith v. Sheffield, supra, this Court in 
considering the testimony of the undivorced wife of plain-
tiff in an alienation of affection suit said: 
"Appellant argues that to hold a husband's wife in-
C()mpetent as a witness against her husband unless his 
consent be obtained, extends and enlarges the purpose 
of the statute as expressly stated by the Legislature, 
and that the purpose of the statute is that a husband 
cannot be examined for or against his wife without her 
consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without 
his consent, as to any matter or thing which would tend 
to destroy the confidence growing out of the marriage 
relation. The .statute clearly presents two different 
situations: first, the disqualification of either husband 
or wife without the ·consent of the other to testify at 
all on any subject for or against the other during the 
marriage relation; second, neither can, during the mar-
riage .or afterwards, be examined by anyone as to any 
communication made by one to the other while the 
marriage relation existed. The statute means what 
it says and is plain, clear and conclusive. It may be 
barbari~c and it may, as appellant's counsel suggest, 
close the mouth of the. wife and mother and prevent 
her from vindicating her honor when assailed in court. 
The law may be wrong. Possibly it should be liberal-
ized but that cannot be done by judicial construction." 
The same statute was in effect the time of the trial 
(Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 104-49-3 (1) ) and is now in 
effect (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-24-8 (1) ) . 
This Court in Re: Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 
15, and in Re: Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 
942, cited by appellant, holds that the communication or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
89 
knowledge imparted must be such as pertain to the confi-
dence of the marriage relations. All testimony excluded at 
any stage in the proceedings by the trial court pursuant 
to this statute fell clearly within this classification and there 
was no testimony excluded which did not have a direct ·re-
lationship to what was said or done in connection with the 
mutual confidence made possible by the marriage relation. 
In fact, dispute interim discussions and rulings, the fact is 
that on every point concerning that relationship, not only 
with respect to Mrs. Wilson's feelings for plaintiff, ~but as 
to their confidential relations and communications, she was 
permitted to get everything she claimed existed, and defend-
ant now claims existed, before the jury, often over the ob-
jection of the plaintiff. The trial court was liberal toward 
to the defendant in this respect and defendant has not poin-
ted out any material evidence on the subject that was actu-
ally excluded or that she was not permitted to fully go into 
at some stage in her testimony. No possible prejudice ap-
pears from any ruling, except as against the plaintiff who 
had to meet repeated hearsay declarations made out of his 
presence by Geraldine Wilson directly involving confiden-
tial communications or observations coming to her solely 
as a result of the marriage relation. 
Several exceptions to the rulings of the court in sus-
taining objections to the form of questions, to hearsay state-
• 
ments made by others not in the presence of plaintiff, such 
as statements by Mrs. Wilson' s father, and rulings on of-
fers which involved clearly incompetent as well as repeti-
tious evidence, and the mass of other rulings thrown hodge-
podge under this point without any showing of prejudice or 
what the ultimate rulings were, all appear sufficiently with-
out merit on their mere statement. The theory of defend-
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ant ~t the trial seemed to be that if he asked enough incom-
petent or borderline questions, or repeated them sufficiently 
often, the trial court might be led into some technical error 
to save the day; and even when the court informally dis-
cussed these questions out of the presence of the jury in 
cooperation with defendant's ·counsel, its comments have 
been seized upon as additional error without any showing 
that any ·competent evidence was withheld from the jury. 
The exclusion of even competent testimony is not reversible 
error if subsequently the witness is permitted to answer 
the same or substantially the same question. Fife v. Adair 
(Okla), 47 P.2d 145. 
The final specific claim of error made by appellant un-
der the present phase of his argument appears on page 71 
of his brief. We quote: 
"We proposed to ask the following question: 'Will you 
tell the court what Dale' attitude was after you returned 
from California?' ( 383) 
"To which we would expect the witness to answer: 
'Well, his attitude toward me was the same as it always 
was. He never paid very much attention to me. I was 
there.. He expected me to be there. I was just a con-
venience around the house as far as Dale was con-
cerned. He never showed me any affection.' (383-4) 
"The court made the following observation: 'The 
court believes that the offer of the last question, if an-
swered as indicated, would be improper and that the 
answer should be stricken upon motion.'" 
We submit that the court's comment was entirely jus-
tified. It must be borne in mind that hour after hour such 
offers had been made, or the right of Mrs. Wilson to thus 
argue defendant's case for defendant had been contended 
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for, and yet the court thus patiently ruled upon all manner 
of these attempts without impatience and in a most judicious 
and fair manner. Will anyone· except appellant seriously 
contend. that the foregoing arguments and conclusions of 
Mrs. Wilson in the form offered (which was a quotation 
from her testimony in the divorce case) would have been 
proper in view of the rules as to privilege, argumentative 
statements, conclusions, mere narrations, or the rules re-
quiring time and place to be fixed or those precluding mere 
generalities? Bear in mind that the witness had already 
been permitted to fully testify as to her feeling for ·Dale 
Wilson at the ti·me of the California trip and at any·other 
time about which counsel desired to ask her (320, 349, 350, 
351). 
All the exc;eptions argued by appellant under Point VII 
(a) are similarly without merit. 
Point vn. (b) · The court did not err in refusing to per-
mit defendant to cross-examine plaintiff as to the testi-
mony given by plaintiff's wife in the trial of tb.e divorce 
action and at the taking of her deposition in that action. 
Appellant's last contention is that the court erred in 
precluding him from reading to the jury, on. ·cross examin-
ation of the plaintiff, from the transcript of the testimony · 
given by Geraldine Wilson ~ the divorce action between her 
and the plaintiff and from her deposition in that case, and 
asking plaintiff if he did not hear her testify according to the 
transcripts in that ca~. Geraldine Beck Wilson in the in-
stant case was present in court. Defendant had a right to 
call her, and in fact did later call her. Yet, defendant 
claimed the right to read to the jury selected extracts from 
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her testimony in the divorce case against her husband, giv .. 
en after the parties had separated. 
The divorce action was commenced July 12th, 1951, 
and was tried October 24th, 25th, and 26th, 1951. Mrs. Wil-
son's . deposition was given in that case August 3rd, 1951 
(162, 164). Dr. Oldroyd was not a party to that action. 
Dale Wilson in his direct examination had claimed that the 
--parties were loving and affectionate up to October, 1950, 
about which time Dr. Oldroyd's close association With Mrs. 
WHson apparently began (151, 155). Plaintiff was cross 
examined in detail about his relationship with his wife from 
the time of. the marriage up to the time he and his wife 
firi.ally separated in March of 1951. He testified thart after 
January 31st, 1951, the attitude of his wife with respect to 
their marriage relationship was not good and that it was 
oold and indifferent and that this attitude did not change 
thereafter (126). He further had testified that in Janu-
ary, 1951, he first learned that his wife's affections for him 
were gone; that at that time she told him she didn't care 
for him (137). There was no claim on his part that after 
that time he thoughrt his wife loved him, or was anything 
but ·cold, indifferent and antagonistic toward him. 
On cross examination, after covering the relationship 
of plaintiff and Geraldine Wilson up to the time of the break 
in January, 1951, defendant's ·counsel asked if it wasn't a 
fact that plaintiff and his wife had trouble practically all 
the time during their maxried life, and the witness replied 
that it was not a fact (158). Plaintiff was then asked if 
plaintiff had heard his wife testify in the divorce action, 
and upon plaintiff saying that he had, plaintiff was asked: 
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Q. "Did you hear your wife say that she had had 
trouble from time to time since the first year of your 
marriage?" 
Upon an objection being made, defendant argued that 
the question called for an admission of what plaintiff heard 
while present at the divorce trial (160) and a declaration 
against interest (162). The court sustained the objection, 
pointing out that the "declaration" was not by plaintiff but · 
by some other person and that it was hearsay and that 
such testimony of the wife would have to be proved by the 
witness so that she could be cross examined (162). Coun-
sel for defendant then specifically stated that his offer was 
not to put plaintiff's wife on the stand, but to read her tes-
timony in the divorce action (167). He then proceeded 
to offer to prove the following statements made by plain-
tiff's wife in the divorce proceeding (p. 29 of the transcript 
of the divorce proceeding----presumably the testimony 
proceeded on the days of October 24th, 25th or 26th, 1951). 
"Well, the trouble at that time was that his aunt was 
living with us. She was not well. I wasn't particularly 
well. I had two very small children, I believe Dale at 
that time was on the road. I just can't remember. 
Anyway, I was alone a great deal of the time with his 
aunt, and she was ill, nervously ill that is. And I could 
not continued waiting on her, waiting on the children 
" . . . . 
(and so on, over her interpretation of some of the early 
married life of the parties.) 
The plaintiff's objection that the offer was "incompe-
tent, immaterial, as hearsay, as contrary to the statute and 
in violation of the statute and in violation of the privilege 
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o~ the former husband . ., was sustained by the 
court on the ground that it was hearsay. 
Counsel then offered numerous excerpts from Geral-
dine Wilson's testimony from the transcript in the divorce 
case, assuming to narrate, argue and detail communications 
and troubles between the parties during their married life 
prior to the ~claimed alienation of her affection, and indi-
cated he wished. to read such ex·cerpts in the presence of 
the jury and to ask if plaintiff at the divorce trial did not 
hear his wife so testify (171-183). 
Appellant argues that "the testimony was not offered 
for the purpose of establishing the facts testified to, but 
for· the purpose of showing that plaintiff had heard from 
his wife's own lips statements discrediting his claim that 
they were happy." There was no issue in the alienation 
suit as to whether, following the claimed alienation, plain-
tiff had heard his wife testify in a divorce trial. If evidence 
in another case, not involving the same parties, could be 
narrated before the· jury under such guise, there would be 
no limit to getting improper matters before the jury under 
the guise of cross examination. Of course, at the time of di-
vorce trial, when the alienation was complete,, Mrs. Wilson 
was unfriendly toward the plaintiff, undoubtedly as a result 
of the very alienation of which complaint is made. Her nar-
rations and arguments then were not rendered competent 
because plaintiff heard them any more than was incompe-
tent testi·mony at the instant trial rendered competent by 
plaintiff's being present in ~court. 
Declarations of the spouse showing want of conjugal 
affection are not to be admitted unless it affirmatively ap-
pears that they were made before the spouse was the sub-
ject of intrigue with, or under the influence of, the defend-
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ant in whose behalf they are sought to be introduced. John-
son v. Richards (Idaho) 294 Pac. 507. After this has oc-
curred, _they are inadmissible as hearsay. Brison v. McKel-
lop (Okla)- 138 Pac. 154. Mumper v.Webster (Ore) 3 P.2d 
753. 
Most of ~e excerpts from the divorce transcript were 
mere narration and conclusions concerning the claimed re-
lations of the parties given at the divorce trial. All related 
to periods prior to the claimed alienation of affection. All 
were from testimony given after the .claimed alienation was 
completed. Most of them would not have been admissible 
if offered to be proved by the witness in person, and none 
of them would have been admissible- even though they were 
included in a deposition in the alienatio~ of affection suit 
itself, since the witness was not a party and she was pres-
ent in oourt and available to testify in person. Utah Rules· 
of Civil Procedure 26 (d) (3). Moreover, except for mere 
arguments and conclusions in that transcript, when Mr~~·. 
Wilson was actually called personally she testified to prac-
tically all the facts covered in the proffered excerpts from 
the divorce transcript anyway. Under such circumstances, 
the rulings of the court were proper on several different · 
grounds, and were the only conceivable rulings that could :1 
have been made under the circumstances. They could not 
be_ ~eemed ·prejudicial in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
What was said by the Colorado court in concluding its· 
opinion affinning the lower ·court in Suppersteiri v. Woods, 
40 P.2d 622, seems pertinent by way of ·summary here: 
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"We have given this record diligent investigation. The 
case of the defendant was well presented and tried :})e. 
low, ~as it has been upon this review, by able and in-
genious counseL The jury evidently disbelieved the 
testimony of the de·fendant himself. In the very nature 
of thing·s, in cases like the one before us, direct and 
positive evidence of the witnesses, aside from the tes-
timony of the parties themselves, would ·be difficult to 
obtain .. If the jury believed the testimony of the plain-
tiff, and it evidently did, and we see nothing unreason-
able in it, the verdict was a righteous one, and the trial 
court approved of the jury's findings and entered judg-
ment accordingly.'' 
The case at bar was tried before a jury concerning 
which there is no showing of any bias or prejudice. It was 
tried before an able judge whose careful, fair and patient rul-
ings, sometimes in the face of the most unreasonable and 
protracted insistence upon clearly incompetent testimony by 
defendant, belie the defendant's attacks upon him. The 
facts and law fully justified and required a verdict in favor 
of the plai·ntiff. 
Any other conclusion, or any reduction of the verdict, 
would be an undue depreciation of the value of conjugal 
rights and of the mental pain, suffering and humiliation 
attendant upon their ruthless, persistent and studied viola-
tion; \YOUld be an unjustified acceptance of a pattern ex-
pounded by the defendant which would strike deep at the 
very institution of marriage. The complaint stated a cause 
of action and the court did not err in overruling defendant's 
motions attacking the complaint. The verdict is not ex-
-cessive in view of the unprecedented combination of circum-
stances as shown hy the record in this case, and there is no 
indication that it was the result of any passion or prejudice. 
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The only complaints the defendant can ~make with basis in 
the reco~d are that the jury did not believe all of his testi-
mony and did not adopt 'his theory of the evidence and that 
they placed a higher value on plaintiff's marriage than he, 
the defendant, did. 
The evidence was abundant to support the verdict and 
the court did not err in refusing to grant defendant's m<> 
tions for a directed verdict or for a new trial. The evidence 
of malice, wilfulnes and wantonness of the defendant went 
beyond what the law required as a foundation for ptmitive 
damages. Evidence as to defendant's wealth was properly 
received to assist the jury in determining what ~would be an 
appropriate amount for punitive damages. The court did 
not eiT in instructing the jury, nor did it err in ruling on 
the admissibility of the evidence. 
No prejudicial error appears in the record. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, 
with costs to the plaintiff and respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
CHRISTENSON & CHRllSTENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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